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The construction industry has, in recent years, become the source of
increased litigation. The sophisticated nature of the services provided
by architects and engineers has tempted practitioners and courts to
apply tort principles when resolving commercial loss disputes involv-
ing design professionals. In his Article, Mr. Espel examines the con-
flict between tort and contract principles in this arena and
recommends that the courts resist the temptation to use tort theories
when resolving disputes of this kind.
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INTRODUCTION
In an era in which expanding tort theories seem to dominate
litigation, the Minnesota Supreme Court has preferred the
more circumscribed principles of contract theory for commer-
cial loss cases. The court has ruled that contract law governs
lawsuits to recoup purely economic damages. The court has
been unwilling to recognize claims of negligence and strict lia-
bility for economic losses.
Cases which test the boundaries between contract and tort
present difficulties. The difficulties are nowhere more evident
than in cases involving the duties and liabilities of design pro-
fessionals in construction disputes. This subject presents a
perplexing blend of contract and tort theories.
Generally, the duties of a design professional are defined by
contractual relationships.' Basically, the design professional
contracts to render services. The test for unsatisfactory serv-
ices is generally expressed in terms of negligence. Indeed, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has said that the measure of liability
is the same whether a claim sounds in contract or in tort. 2
Because of this, the court has never squarely decided
whether claims for economic loss involving design profession-
als or other construction project parties sound in contract or
tort. The extent to which contract law provides the exclusive
liability theory for economic losses has an important bearing,
however, on many questions.3 These include:
1. See, e.g., A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1952). Corbin states:
A study of its common usage will show that the term "contract" has been
made to denote three different kinds of things in various combinations:
(1) the series of operative acts of the parties expressing their assent, or some
part of these acts; (2) a physical document executed by the parties as an
operative fact in itself and as lasting evidence of their having performed
other necessary acts expressing their intentions; (3) the legal relations re-
sulting from the operative acts of the parties, always including the relation
of right in one party and duty in the other.
Id. at 4.
2. Kostohryz v. McGuire, 298 Minn. 513, 517, 212 N.W.2d 850, 854 (1973).
3. One can find publications which acknowledge the importance of the issue
without any satisfactory examinaton of the relevant policies or analysis. In ACRET,
ARCHITECTS & ENGINEERS (2d ed. 1984), for example, one finds references to the
importance of determining whether liability sounds in contract or tort without any
explanation of how the determination is to be made. Id. § 1.15. The author seems to
assume that cases which measure services by a test of negligence are determined by
tort rules. In Minnesota, at least, this does not necessarily follow.
The annotation, Tort Liability of Project Architect for Economic Damages Suffered by Con-
tractor, 65 A.L.R. 3d 249 (1975 & Supp. 1986), collects some of the cases which bear
[Vol. 13
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1. Are the duties of a design professional to be defined by
contract interpretation or by other rules?
2. What role do the concepts of privity and third party
beneficiary play in economic loss cases?
3. Does the statute of limitations for contract apply to
claims against design professionals for economic loss?
4. What is the place of comparative fault in the loss alloca-
tion rules for economic loss cases?
The supreme court has not yet answered these questions
completely. The court has been disinclined to permit the va-
garies of negligence theory to supersede rules of contract law
in commercial loss cases, deferring instead to the bargained-
for expectations of the parties. Some uncertainty remains on
the availability of negligence claims for economic loss, how-
ever, in commercial cases that do not involve the Uniform
Commercial Code. Privity and statute of limitation issues are
yet unresolved. The court has provided some general princi-
ples for loss allocation. Opinions have not addressed certain
common questions, however, and further elaboration will be
helpful.
This Article is intended to summarize the cases, both to
highlight the governing law and to identify the many areas of
doubt. Discussion of the following topics will be presented:
Contracts in Construction Projects
Contract vs. Negligence in Claims Against Design
Professionals
Commercial Loss Opinions That Did Not Directly Involve
Claims Against Design Professionals
Separate Standards for Various Roles
Privity and Third-Party Beneficiary Theory
Misrepresentation Theory
Statute of Limitations Issues That Depend Upon Choice of
Theory
Allocation of Responsibility
A Critique of the Application of Tort Law for Commercial
Cases
Settlements and Releases
on this general subject. It appears that the cases are evenly divided on the question
of whether liability in tort exists.
The point of this article is to explore those issues where it seems to matter which
theory applies.
1987]
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I. CONTRACTS IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
Participants in a construction project generally document
their undertakings, duties, and liabilities in written contracts.
Organizations of architects, engineers, and contractors have
sponsored standard form contracts which dominate construc-
tion transactions. The American Institute of Architects (AIA),
a national professional association, provides model agree-
ments for dealings between owners and architects, architects
and consultants, owners and contractors, and other situa-
tions. 4 The Engineers' Joint Contract Documents Committee
4. The AIA publishes copyrighted forms of agreement, many of which have
been approved and endorsed by the Associated General Contractors of America. Ex-
amples include:
a. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN OWNER AND CONTRACTOR, WHERE THE BASIS OF PAY-
MENT IS A STIPULATED SUM, AIA Doc. No. A-101 (1977).
b. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN OWNER AND CONTRACTOR, WHERE THE BASIS OF PAY-
MENT IS A STIPULATED SUM, (CONSTRUCTED MANAGEMENT EDITION),
AIA Doc. No. A-101/CM (Contractual Management Edition 1980).
c. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN OWNER AND CONTRACTOR, WHERE THE BASIS OF PAY-
MENT IS THE COST OF THE WORK PLUS A FEE, AIA Doc. No. A-Ill
(1974).
d. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE
CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION, AIA Doc. No. A-201 (1976). The
AIA is in the process of updating the general conditions.
e. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE
CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION, AIA Doc. No. A-291/CM (Con-
struction Management Edition 1980).
f. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, SUBCONTRACT-STANDARD
FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN CONTRACTOR AND SUBCONTRACTOR,
AIA Doc. No. A-401 (1978).
g. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN DESIGN/BUILDER AND CONTRACTOR, AIA Doc. No.
A-491 (1985).
h. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITECT, AIA Doc. No. B-141
(1977).
i. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITECT, AIA Doc. No. B-141/CM
(Construction Management Edition 1980).
j. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITECT FOR DESIGNATED SERVICES,
AIA Doc. No. B-161 (1977).
k. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN OWNER AND CONSTRUCTION MANAGER, AIA Doc. No.
B-801 (1980).
I. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREE-
MENTS BETWEEN DESIGN/BUILDER AND ARCHITECT, AIA Doc. No. B-
901 (1985).
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(EJCDC)5 and the Associated General Contractors of America 6
are two other organizations which sponsor supplementary or
competing forms of agreement. The AIA and the EJCDC both
m. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN ARCHITECT AND ENGINEER, AIA Doc. No. C-141
(1982).
n. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN ARCHITECT AND CONSULTANT, AIA Doc. No. C-431
(1982).
5. The Engineers' Joint Contract Documents Committee makes available for
sale the following copyrighted forms of agreement:
a. ENGINEERS' JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITrEE, STANDARD FORM OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ENGINEER FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES,
EJCDC Doc. No. 1910-1 (1984).
b. ENGINEERS' JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITTEE, STANDARD FORM OF
LETTER AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ENGINEER FOR PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES, EJCDC Doc. No. 1910-2 (1985).
c. ENGINEERS' JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITTEE, STANDARD GENERAL
CONDITIONS OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, EJCDC Doc. No. 1910-10
(1983).
d. ENGINEERS' JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITTEE, STANDARD FORM OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND CONTRACTOR: ON THE BASIS OF A STIPU-
LATED PRICE, EJCDC Doc. No. 1910-8-A-1 (1983). ON THE BASIS OF A COST-
PLUS, EJCDC Doc. No. 1910-8-A-2 (1983).
e. ENGINEERS' JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITTEE, CHANGE ORDER,
EJCDC Doc. No. 1910-8-B (1983).
f. ENGINEERS' JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITTEE, STANDARD FORM OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN ENGINEER AND ARCHITECT FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES,
EJCDC Doc. No. 1910-10 (1985).
g. ENGINEERS' JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITTEE, STANDARD FORM OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN ENGINEER AND ASSOCIATE ENGINEER FOR PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES, EJCDC Doc. No. 1910-13 (1985).
h. ENGINEERS' JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITTEE, STANDARD FORM OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN ENGINEER AND CONSULTANT FOR PROFESSIONAL SERV-
ICES, EJCDC Doc. No. 1910-14 (1985).
i. ENGINEERS' JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITTEE, STANDARD FORM OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND PROJECT MANAGER FOR PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES, EJCDC Doc. No. 1910-15 (1977).
j. ENGINEERS' JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITTEE, STANDARD FORM OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ENGINEER FOR STUDY AND REPORT PROFES-
SIONAL SERVICES, EJCDC Doc. No. 1910-19 (1985).
k. ENGINEERS' JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENT COMMITTEE, STANDARD FORM OF
PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND CONTRACTOR, EJCDC Doc.
No. 1910-26-A (1981).
In addition, the Engineers'Joint Contract Documents Committee publishes and sells
various commentaries, guides, and cross-references which can be used to coordinate
the relationships between parties.
6. The AGC publishes ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA, SUB-
CONTRACT FOR BUILDING CONSTRUCTION, AGC Doc. No. 600 (1984), and other stan-
dard forms for typical construction project contracts. Other forms can be found.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation was adopted in 1984. See generally Smith, Develop-
ments in Standard Form Contracts, 85.4 CONSTRUCTION BRIEFINGS (1985).
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also sponsor model general conditions which set forth in some
detail the nature of contractual obligations of the owners, pro-
fessionals, and contractors.
It is important to recognize the specificity of the undertak-
ings contained in these various types of contracts and docu-
ments. Design professionals may be employed in a variety of
modes, some more demanding than others. Frequently, the
contract documents reflect undertakings or limitations which
the parties carefully negotiate. Even if the parties do not en-
gage in detailed negotiations, they may select their form docu-
ments with care and with a recognition of the industry usage
which those standard forms imply. Usually, the parties are on
relatively equal bargaining levels. Depending upon the size
and complexity of the project, the parties frequently consult
with lawyers, at least in connection with some aspects of the
contractual terms.
The extent to which design professionals are obligated to
inspect or supervise construction provides a fruitful example
of the variability of contractual roles. In the modern world of
construction, this is an economic, negotiated issue. Architects
generally offer limited, periodic site visits. Such observations
will give information as to the general nature of the progress
but not as to many of the details of the construction. Owners
occasionally desire a more intensive role on the part of archi-
tects and they find that such requests lead to demands for
greater compensation.
In many projects, owners contract separately with construc-
tion managers for the observation or supervision of construc-
tion. In such cases, the design professionals perform fewer
periodic visits and may only inspect the site after substantial
completion, when most of the construction details are covered.
Other variations are common. For example, in design-build
projects, the general contractor, not the owner, has the con-
tractual relationship with the design professional. In such
cases, owners often contract with independent architects, engi-
neers, or contractors to perform periodic observations. In ad-
dition, lenders regularly retain architects to provide
construction progress reports.
One occasionally finds courts and parties who expect that
architects have responsibility, not only to provide limited ob-
servations of a contractor's work, but also to supervise the con-
[Vol. 13
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tractor in the details of the work.7 Most project manuals
include a general condition that disclaims any such responsibil-
ity on the part of the design professional.8 The contractor is
generally the party who accepts responsibility for determining
the means and methods of performing the construction and
for warranting compliance with the design as set forth in the
drawings and specifications. The word "supervise" is rarely
accepted by designers. 9 If the parties have not negotiated and
agreed that the design professionals have a "supervisory" re-
sponsibility, imposition of such a duty by the courts would dra-
matically upset the bargained-for allocation of responsibilities.
The various agreements of construction project participants
are normally well documented. Architects and contractors are
accustomed to the forms and the procedures that lead to con-
tract execution. However, oral and handshake agreements still
exist. Parties occasionally perform work before they sign con-
tract documents. Frequently, architects content themselves
with abbreviated letter agreements with owners but then rec-
ommend general conditions with elaborate detail for the own-
ers to incorporate into the contract documents with the
contractors. Awkward questions of contract interpretation can
present themselves when architects rely upon the terms of the
7. Such a perception may or may not have been true in the past. One can find
commentaries which conclude that the architect normally has extensive control of the
construction project. See, e.g., Lehman, The Roles of Architect and Contractor in Construc-
tion Management, 6 U. OF MICH.J.L. REF. 447, 452 (1973). "The theory that the legal
responsibility of the architect should be commensurate with his control of the con-
struction project has resulted in expansion of liability to third parties." Id.
It has been correctly pointed out, however, that contemporary construction
projects often do not include the degree of architectural control that has been cited
to justify expansion of liability. See, e.g., Note, Architectural Malpractice: A Contract-Based
Approach, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1979).
8. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM AGREEMENT
BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITECT, AIA Doc. No. B-141 (1977). That document
provides:
The architect shall not have control or charge of and shall not be responsi-
ble for construction means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures,
or for safety precautions and programs in connection with the work, for the
acts or omissions of the Contractor, Subcontractors or any other persons
performing any of the Work, or for the failure of any of them to carry out
the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents.
Id.
9. Two illustrative cases in which other jurisdictions considered and rejected
arguments that architects owed a duty to "supervise" contractors or subcontractors
are Jewish Board of Guardians v. Grumman Allied Indus., Inc., 96 A.D.2d 465, 467,
464 N.Y.S.2d 778, 780 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), and RJ. Reagan Co. v. Kent, 654
S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
1987]
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general conditions that describe the role of the architects even
though their letter agreement contained no similar provisions.
Where the documentation is unsatisfactory, however, the law
of contract interpretation can fill in most of the blanks even if
the agreements have been verbal.
II. CONTRACT VS. TORT
A. The Law in 'Design Professional' Cases
Notwithstanding the voluntary contracts which bring con-
struction parties together, plaintiffs have frequently persuaded
trial courts to submit economic loss claims against architects,
contractors, or other construction participants to ajury on the-
ories of negligence as well as breach of contract. This has led
to a long line of opinions in Minnesota that wrestle with the
proper handling of commercial loss claims against design
professionals.
An early example of these issues can be found in Kostohryz v.
McGuire.10 In that case, the owners and the architect entered
into a contract on a standard form used by architects for the
design of a home. The owners exceeded their budget for the
construction of the home and sued the architect to recover
damages. 12 The owners relied upon a negligence theory and a
breach of contract theory.' 3 The jury found in favor of the
owners on both counts.' 4 Those issues which were ostensibly
based upon the negligence claim were settled prior to the ap-
peal, so that the only issues before the supreme court dealt
with interpretation of the contract between the parties.' 5 The
supreme court affirmed the jury's verdict that the architect
breached a condition of the contract.' 6 The supreme court
commented on the duty and liability of an architect as follows:
The duty and liability of an architect, whether sounding in
tort or arising out of a breach of a contract, is measured as
stated in Gammel v. Ernst and Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 254,
72 N.W.2d 364, 367 (1955). In that case, involving the lia-
bility of public accountants, this court said:
10. 298 Minn. 513, 212 N.W.2d 850 (1973).
11. Id. at 513, 212 N.W.2d at 851.
12. Id. at 514, 212 N.W.2d at 852.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 516, 212 N.W.2d at 854.
[Vol. 13
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* * * [T]hey would be required to perform the services
for which they were engaged in good faith and with rea-
sonable care and competence and would be liable for
damages occasioned by any failure to do so. 1
7
The court did not comment explicitly on whether the claim in
negligence was proper for the type of damages alleged. The
court was careful to identify the procedural posture of the case,
and the court referred to the claims of negligence as "two of
the most litigated issues."' 8
The supreme court next talked about the underlying theory
for construction claims in Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Thorsen &
Thorshov, Inc. 19 In Northern Petrochemical, the owner of a build-
ing successfuly sued both the architect and the contractor for
damages caused by building settlement. The supreme court
affirmed the findings of liability, describing the causes of action
in terms of "negligent breaches of contractual obligations." 20
The court applied a rule of loss allocation derived from tort
law. As written, the opinion drew no careful distinction be-
tween contract and tort doctrines.
The Minnesota Supreme Court continued to imply that con-
struction claims might sound in negligence as well as contract
in City of Eveleth v. Ruble. 21 The trial court had awarded dam-
ages to a city and public utilities corporation from the design
engineers for alleged negligence and breach of contract in the
design of a water treatment plant.22 The supreme court's
opinion dealt primarily with the necessity of expert opinion to
support the findings of damages.
The supreme court recited "legal principles" which bore on
the issues to be considered:
(1) One who undertakes to render professional services is
under a duty to the person for whom the service is to
be performed to exercise such care, skill, and diligence
as men in that profession ordinarily exercise under like
circumstances.
(2) The circumstances to be considered in determining
the standard of care, skill, and diligence to be required
17. Id. at 517, 212 N.W.2d at 854.
18. Id. at 514, 212 N.W.2d at 852.
19. 297 Minn. 118, 211 N.W.2d 159 (1973).
20. Id. at 130, 211 N.W.2d at 168.
21. 302 Minn. 249, 225 N.W.2d 521 (1974).
22. Id. at 251, 225 N.W.2d at 523.
1987]
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in this case include the terms of the employment
agreement, the nature of the problem which the sup-
plier of the service represented himself as being com-
petent to solve, and the effect reasonably to be
anticipated from the proposed remedies upon the bal-
ance of the system.
(3) Ordinarily, a determination that the care, skill, and dil-
igence exercised by a professional engaged in furnish-
ing skilled services for compensation was less than that
normally possessed and exercised by members of that
profession in good standing and that the damage sus-
tained resulted from the variance requires expert testi-
mony to establish the prevailing standard and the
consequences of departures from it in the case under
consideration.
(4) There are some situations in which a trier of fact may,
without the aid of expert testimony, find damages to
have been caused by the failure of a professional to ex-
ercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence. If the solu-
tion proposed by the professional is one which the
professional would not have proposed had he been
fully informed as to the facts of the problem with
which he was dealing, and if it is clear that the failure
of the professional to ascertain the facts before recom-
mending a solution to the problem was an omission
inconsistent with the professional obligation assumed,
a finding of negligence may be made without the bene-
fit of precise scientific opinion testimony. If it is clear
without resort to expert opinion that this error or
omission on the part of the professional resulted in
damage, and if the causation can be established, and if
the damage can be measured by persons of ordinary
learning and understanding, the opinions of experts
are not needed.
23
Points (3) and (4) represent the points actively considered by
the supreme court. The court noted an "absence of the defini-
tive expert testimony required by the general rule." 24 The
court affirmed an award of one damage item notwithstanding
the absence of expert testimony on the point.2 5 The court re-
manded an award of a second damaged item, however, be-
cause the point was not one which could be determined by
23. Id. at 253-56, 225 N.W.2d at 524-25 (footnotes omitted).
24. Id. at 256, 225 N.W.2d at 525.
25. Id.
[Vol. 13
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reference to common knowledge. 26 Thus, the holdings related
to sufficiency of the evidence and the necessity for specific ex-
pert testimony.
The more pertinent principles for this article are points (1)
and (2) of the "legal principles." In ascertaining the duties of
the designer, the court noted "the terms of the employment
agreement" as the first, but not the exclusive reference. Fur-
ther, in characterizing the issue concerning the second damage
item, the court wrote:
The liability found by the trial court was not based on
breach of contract. The design of the valves and the high
service pumps was found to be negligent. This finding of
damage caused by negligence on the part of the Engineer
implies that the Engineer was under a duty to ascertain the
pressure-bearing capacity of the distribution system and
that his failure to do so made the design of the safety valves
defective for failure to keep the pressure exerted by the
high-service pumps within the pressure-bearing capacity of
the lines. In our judgment, the opinions of experts quali-
fied in the field are needed on the technical questions in-
volved in this finding.27
Superficially, one may read this language as an endorsement of
a negligence theory for economic loss caused by the malprac-
tice of design engineers. This author believes, however, that it
stands for a more limited conclusion.
Notwithstanding that the trial court had determined to
award damages against the engineer on the basis of its own
assessment of negligence, the supreme court began its analysis
by studying the contract between the city and the engineer.2 8
Further, the court remanded the case for reconsideration of
whether expert testimony demonstrated that the duties of the
engineer included an obligation to address the questions al-
leged.2 9 In other words, the supreme court ruled that liability
26. Id. at 264, 225 N.W.2d at 530.
27. 'Id. at 263, 225 N.W.2d at 529.
28. See id. at 252, 256, 225 N.W.2d at 523, 526.
29. Id. at 265, 225 N.W.2d at 530. In most cases, the question of whether a de-
sign professional has failed to meet the standards of other professionals turns on
expert testimony. Id. at 263-65, 225 N.W.2d at 529-30. Where the alleged negli-
gence does not involve questions outside the purview of the jury, expert testimony is
not required. In Zontelli & Sons, Inc. v. City of Nashwauk, 353 N.W.2d 600 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 373 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1985), for example, the trial court
found negligence even though the city, which pressed the claim against the engineer,
had offered no expert testimony in support of that finding. The court of appeals and,
1987]
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could be sustained only if expert testimony demonstrated that
the engineer's negligence violated a duty grounded in his con-
tractual undertaking with the city.30 Whether the engineer's
liaiblity to the city was to be expressed in contract or tort did
not affect the outcome of the case, and, thus, any implication of
the opinion about the theory is dicta. In any event, the court
clearly implied that, even for claims which might be character-
ized as sounding in negligence, it would be improper to im-
pute duties without due attention to the underlying contract.
Shortly after the City of Eveleth opinion, the Minnesota
Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion that explicitly
treated the employment of a design professional as a matter of
contract. In Moundsview Independent School District No. 621 v.
Buetow & Associates, Inc. ,31 the court was asked to review a sum-
mary judgment in favor of an architect based upon the archi-
tect's contract with the school district.32 The case arose after a
windstorm ripped a portion of the roof off of a school, alleg-
edly due to the failure of a contractor to adequately fasten the
roof to the building.33 The architect's contract provided for
general, periodic inspections and provided that the architect
would have no responsibility for acts or omissions of the con-
tractor or subcontractors.3 4 The supreme court affirmed the
summary judgment in favor of the architect, explaining:
It is the general rule that the employment of an architect is a
matter of contract, and consequently, he is responsible for
all the duties enumerated within the contract of employ-
ment. An architect, as a professional, is required to per-
in turn, the supreme court affirmed liability, both considering the engineer's negli-
gence so obvious that expert testimony was unnecessary. See also Overland Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Millard School Dist., 369 N.W.2d 69 (Neb. 1985); Annotation, Necessity of
Expert Testimony to Show Malpractice of Architect, 3 A.L.R.4TH 1023 (1981).
30. City of Eveleth, 302 Minn. at 264, 225 N.W.2d at 530. Support for the view that
the Minnesota common law analysis required proof of a breach of contract, rather
than proof of the tort of negligence, can be found in Cowles v. City of Minneapolis,
128 Minn. 452, 151 N.W. 184 (1915) (action against engineer discussed generally in
contract terms with issues of negligence having to do with violations of contractual
duty); City of East Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296, 298, 141 N.W. 181, 182
(1913) (claim against an accountant "is not an action in tort, but an action to recover
damages for breach of contract").
31. 253 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1977) (per curiam).
32. Id. at 837.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 837-38.
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form his services with reasonable care and competence and
will be liable in damages for any failure to do so.
Thus, the question of whether Buetow breached its duty to
supervise the construction project is to be determind with
reference to the general supervisory obligation enumerated
in the contract .
5
Based upon the unambiguous language of the contract, the
supreme court determined that the architect had no responsi-
bility for the failure of the contractor to perform its work prop-
erly and, therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment
in favor of the architect.
The court's next decision is a well known leading opinion on
the liability of architects and other design professionals. City of
Mounds View v. Walarvi 3 6 limits the liability of design profes-
sionals "to those situations in which the professional is negli-
gent in the provision of his or her services." 37 The court
defined the scope of a design professional's duty by reference
to contract principles. The supreme court admitted the possi-
bility that design professionals might create express warran-
ties, but the court adopted a strict construction approach to
such express warranties and rejected altogether the appropri-
ateness of implying warranties chargeable against design pro-
fessionals. The rationale given for this position was that the
strict liability that might flow from implied warranties would
35. Id. at 839 (citations omitted). A case which reached a similar result on differ-
ent facts is Ferentchak v. Village of Frankfort, 105 Ill. 2d 474, 475 N.E.2d 822 (1985).
In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that an engineer who developed a
water drainage system for a subdivision devoted to custom-built homes was not con-
tractually required to establish elevation for the foundations for the homes because
his contract did not require it. A jury had found that the engineer was liable for
negligent failure to set the elevation. The supreme court determined that the engi-
neer could not be liable for failure to establish the foundation levels unless required
by contract to do so. Id. at 825-26.
36. 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978). See also Gravely v. The Providence Partner-
ship, 549 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1977) (applying Virginia law); Fretschel v. Burbank, 351
N.W.2d 403, 404 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (no implied warranty for non-builder).
37. 263 N.W.2d at 423. The Walyarvi opinion quoted and relied upon City of
Eveleth, 302 Minn. at 253-54, 225 N.W.2d at 524 n.2 which stated a general duty for
those rendering professional services:
One who undertakes to render professional services is under a duty to the
person for whom the service is to be performed to exercise such care, skill
and diligence as men in that profession ordinarily exercise under the
circumstances.
Waliarvi, 263 N.W.2d at 424.
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unfairly expose professionals who work with inexact sciences.
The Walijarvi opinion explained:
The majority position limits the liability of architects and
others rendering 'professional' services to those situations
in which the professional is negligent in the provision of his
or her services ....
Architects, doctors, engineers, attorneys, and others deal in
somewhat inexact sciences and are continually called upon
to exercise their skilled judgment in order to anticipate and
provide for random factors which are incapable of precise
measurement. The indeterminate nature of these factors
makes it impossible for professional service people to gauge
them with complete accuracy in every instance. Thus, doc-
tors cannot promise that every operation will be successful;
a lawyer can never be certain that a contract he drafts is
without latent ambiguity; and an architect cannot be certain
that a structural design will interact with natural forces as
anticipated. Because of the inescapable possibility of error
which inheres in these services, the law has traditionally re-
quired, not perfect results, but rather the exercise of that
skill and judgment which can be reasonably expected from
similarly situated professionals.
3 8
The court's holding unequivocally requires an assessment of
negligence in determining the liability of design professionals.
Nonetheless, the supreme court couched the liability analysis
for design professionals in the context of contract law.
In Lesmeister v. Dilly, 39 the supreme court expressly retracted
any implication in the Northern Petrochemical opinion that the lia-
bility theory for construction litigaton sounded in negligence.
The court explained: "We did not intend in Northern Petrochem
to recognize a new cause of action in negligence, i.e., negligent
breach of a contractual duty. We only announced a rule of
damage apportionment . . ,,40 Lesmeister characterized claims
against architects, designers, and other participants in a con-
38. 263 N.W.2d at 424.
39. 330 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1983).
40. Id. at 102. One must use any reference to Lesmeister with care. The court
cautioned that a peculiar procedural posture required it to disclaim precedential sig-
nificance. Yet, the same opinion announced rules of clarification. Moreover, both
the court of appeals and the supreme court have cited Lesmeister as authority. In this
author's view, the opinion is at least provocative. It was not, however, an exhaustive
treatment of relevant precedents. For example, Lesmeister made no reference to City of
Eveleth.
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struction context as claims which sound in contract, not in tort.
The opinion explained:
The gravamen of this case in our view is contractual. Any
duties between the parties arose out of contracts, about
which there was opportunity to bargain and allocate risks
and duties. This was not a situation in which parties were
fortuitously brought together, as in an automobile accident.
We conclude, therefore, that it was error to submit the the-
ory of 'negligent breach' of contract to the jury, or to allow
apportionment of fault either based on the pure contract or
the 'negligent breach' cause of action.
4 1
Thus, Lesmeister favors a general contract analysis for commer-
cial loss cases. The court's emphasis on the bargaining posi-
tion of the parties is a theme that finds echoes in other cases.
The importance of contract as the setting for commercial
construction disputes has been reaffirmed recently in Zontelli &
Sons, Inc. v. City of Nashwauk.42 In Zontelli, the contractor for a
municipal storm sewer project sought extra compensation
from the city and from the city's engineer on the basis of mis-
leading plans and specifications. 43 The city, in turn, pressed a
claim against the engineer for contribution or indemnity.
44
The jury found that the engineer had acted negligently in in-
vestigating subsurface conditions. The trial court had submit-
ted the case to the jury upon the assumption that "the
underlying nature of Zontelli's claims lay in tort and, therefore,
applied comparative fault principles under MINN. STAT.
§ 604.01 (1982)." 4 5 The court of appeals concluded that ap-
portionment of fault was not proper. The court of appeals
explained:
While we can understand why the trial court wanted to ap-
portion fault in this case, apportionment was not proper.
Regardless of the fact that some of Zontelli's claims sound
in tort, the basis of each claim is rooted in a contract. The
claim of breach of warranty is based on the estimates in-
cluded in Zontelli's contract with the City. Zontelli's claim
of negligence, a tort claim, requires proof of the existence
of a duty of care flowing from Wallace to Zontelli. Such a
41. Id. at 102.
42. 373 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1985).
43. Id. at 747.
44. See id.
45. Zontelli & Sons, Inc. v. City of Nashwauk, 353 N.W.2d 600, 604 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984).
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duty, if it exists at all, could only arise from the contract
between Zontelli and the City or the contract between the
City and Wallace. Zontelli's third-party beneficiary claim is
dependent on the contract between the City and Wallace.
46
In so holding, the court of appeals quoted and relied on the
analysis of Lesmeister.47
The supreme court accepted review and refined the liability
analysis. As a starting point, the supreme court approved the
contract analysis of the court of appeals. "As the court of ap-
peals correctly determined, the city's liability to Zontelli is con-
tractual because the city's duty to reimburse Zontelli for extra
work arises out of the contract, a determination not contested
on appeal to this court." 48 In analyzing the city's liability to
the contractor, the supreme court opinion worked entirely in
the context of the contract between the city and the contractor.
Similarly, when the supreme court turned to the issue of the
engineer's liability to the city, the court examined the question
in terms of the engineer's breach of its contractual commit-
ment to the city. The supreme court sustained the finding that
the engineer's negligence established breach of contract. 49
The supreme court awarded the city indemnity, based upon
the breach of contract by the engineer. 50 The supreme court
expressly reversed the determinations of the trial court and the
court of appeals that contribution, a theory based upon mutual
negligence, was the appropriate remedy. 51 Rather, the court
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 373 N.W.2d at 751 (citation omitted).
49. See id. at 755. The court cited, in passing, Kostohryz, 298 Minn. at 517, 212
N.W.2d at 854, and City of Eveleth, 302 Minn. at 253-55, 225 N.W.2d at 524-25. For
additional cases on the subject, see Annotation, supra note 29, at 1023.
50. Zontelli, 373 N.W.2d at 755. The court commented in footnote 6:
Although we have previously recognized indemnity to reimburse a party
only for a liability arising from a tort, the principles underlying the rules are
the same for a liability arising out of a contract.
Id. (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 756. In a footnote, the court explicitly reserved any comment on the
question of whether the contractor had a claim against the engineer for negligent
misrepresentation. The opinion states:
Zontelli sued both the city and Wallace; the city cross-claimed against Wal-
lace. We are awarding Zontelli compensation from the city and granting the
city indemnity from Wallace. We need not decide, therefore, whether
Zontelli has a direct action against Wallace for negligent misrepresentation
because the practical result would be the same in any event.
Id. at 756 n.9. The court's reference to negligent misrepresentation should not be
confused with a reservation of the theory of negligence as such. As will be discussed
[Vol. 13
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss1/2
CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION
held, the remedy was to be found in indemnity. From the
overall perspective, the supreme court resolved the dispute on
a contract by contract basis.
52
In the main, this series of cases reflects a preference for con-
tractual theory for economic loss cases. 53 Except for Lesmeister,
one cannot find an unambiguous statement that contract law
provides the exclusive avenue of relief. Neither can one find
an unambiguous holding to the contrary.
Given that the parties to a construction project come to-
gether by virtue of a series of mutual contractual undertakings,
it seems logical that the definition of duties and obligations
should be determined in the context of contract law. This
point is particularly compelling when one speaks of economic
losses involving primarily disappointed expectations of one or
more of the parties. Even if the supreme court ultimately were
to conclude that claims for economic loss against design pro-
fessionals or other parties providing services are to sound in
tort, the definition of a party's duties should derive from the
voluntary contracts negotiated by the parties. 54 In other
below, the supreme court has ruled that the negligence theory is not available,
notwithstanding that the theory of negligent misrepresentation survives. See, e.g.,
Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d
816 (Minn. 1984).
52. The same type of reasoning can be found in D & A Dev. Co. v. Butler, 357
N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). In that opinion, the court refused to permit re-
covery of economic damages in the absence of some contractual duty running from
the architect to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had alleged no contractual duty owed to
the plaintiff by the architect, either through direct privity or as a third-party benefici-
ary and, therefore, obtained no recovery. The court of appeals has since limited the
holding of D & A Development. See Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-
Mayeron & Assoc., Inc., 386 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). It is the view of
this author that D &A Development was properly decided and that Waldor Pump strays
from a proper interpretation of the supreme court rulings.
53. For commentary with a similar, although not identical, perspective see Note,
supra note 7, at 1075.
54. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) introduces the relation between tort
and contract actions as follows:
The fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in the nature of
the interests protected. Tort actions are created to protect the interest in
freedom from various kinds of harm. The duties of conduct which give rise
to them are imposed by the law, and are based primarily upon social policy,
and not necessarily upon the will or intention of the parties .... Contract
actions are created to protect the interest in having promises performed.
Contract obligations are imposed because of conduct of the parties mani-
festing consent, and are owed only to the specific individuals named in the
contract.
Id. at 613. Prosser described the distinction between nonfeasance, for which con-
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words, the extent of the duties should be no greater, merely
because claims are said to sound in tort, than they would if the
claims sound in contract. 55
The fact that the measure of a design professional's per-
formance asks whether the design professional has been negli-
gent does not necessarily mean that the underlying theory of
the case sounds in tort. For the most part, the mutual obliga-
tions and liabilities of the other parties are determined by con-
tract analysis. Uniformity of analysis and result is enhanced if
the doctrines applied to design professionals are compatible
with the doctrines applied to the other parties.
B. The Law in Analogous Commercial Law Cases
In a parallel series of cases, the supreme court has ruled ex-
plicitly that claims for economic loss must be pursued in con-
tract or warranty and not in negligence or tort. The supreme
court introduced a landmark ruling that drew its vitality from
the Uniform Commercial Code in Superwood Corp. v.
tracts provide the exclusive remedy, and malfeasance, for which a tort remedy may be
available. Id. at 617-18. He went on to explain:
The principle which seems to have emerged from the decisions in the
United States is that there will be liability in tort for misperformance of a
contract whenever there would be liability for gratuitous performance with-
out the contract-which is to say, whenever such misperformance involves a
foreseeable, unreasonable risk of harm to the interests of the plaintiff.
Id. This general principle does not readily lend itself to application in the construc-
tion setting. Parties may have dealings with each other which do not necessarily im-
ply obligation or gratuitous performance. Designers frequently have an obligation to
the owners to review and comment upon the performance of contractors. Whether
the design professional's activites occur as an agent of the owner or as an independ-
ent judge depends upon the specific contractual setting procedure. As a general
proposition, it is virtually impossible to say that there would be liability to a contrac-
tor for gratuitous performance without a contract, because, without a contract, there
is no way to tell on whose behalf or in what capacity a design professional is acting.
55. As stated in Independent Consol. School Dist. No. 24 v. Carlstrom, 277
Minn. 117, 151 N.W.2d 784 (1967):
[P]arties may contract for an exclusive remedy which shall be binding on
them in the event of breach of contract. * * * Where parties stipulate what
the consequences of a breach of agreement shall be, such stipulation, if rea-
sonable, is controlling and excludes other consequences. The remedy pro-
vided is exclusive if the contract so declares or clearly shows an intention of
the parties to make it so. * * * It is recognized that parties to a building or
construction contract may stipulate as to the remedies which shall be avail-
able in the event of breach, and the remedies thus agreed upon may be held
exclusive where the intent is made clear.
277 Minn. at 120, 151 N.W.2d at 786-87 (footnotes omitted). See also Berry Asphalt
Co. v. Apex Oil Prod. Co., 215 Minn. 198, 201-02, 9 N.W.2d 437, 439 (1943); Helve-
tia Copper Co. v. Hart-Parr Co., 142 Minn. 74, 79, 171 N.W. 272, 274 (1919).
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Siempelkamp Corp. 5 6 In that case, the purchaser of a product as-
serted claims for diminution of value of the product and for
economic loss arising out of the internal failure of the product.
The statute of limitations under the Uniform Commercial
Code had expired, so the purchaser pursued claims founded in
negligence and strict liability. The supreme court concluded
that those theories were not available in the absence of per-
sonal injury or damage to other property. The principal ra-
tionale for the result derived from the court's reluctance to
permit tort theories to disrupt statutory and contractual expec-
tations under the UCC. 57 The language of the opinion seemed
to extend beyond UCC cases, however, to cover all commercial
loss cases.58
Further support for such a reading can be obtained in Minne-
apolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Associates Architects, Inc. 59
In that case, the plaintiff sued various parties involved in an
improvement to a museum after the glazed brick masonry
facade developed cracking and other problems. Prior to trial,
various parties settled and the owner of the building went to
trial against the brick manufacturer only. The jury concluded
that the bricks themselves were not defective, but the jury also
returned a finding that the manufacturer was negligent in fail-
ing to warn of special precautions necessary for the successful
use of the glazed bricks. The supreme court reversed, holding
that the negligence theory was not available for the recovery of
economic loss. The opinion concluded:
[W]e hold that "economic losses" that arise out of commer-
cial transactions, except those involving personal injury or
loss to other property, are not recoverable under the tort
theories of negligence or strict product liability ....
[D]amages were recoverable, if at all, under the "expecta-
tion-bargain" protection of contract law. 60
56. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981). The validity of the Superwood doctrine has
been enhanced by the recent United States Supreme Court decision in East River
Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986). In that case,
decided on admiralty law, the Supreme Court adopted what it viewed as the majority
rule and rejected negligence and strict liability as theories for recovering economic
loss damages. The Court examined the various policy arguments supporting the
contrary rule and found them unpersuasive. Id. at
57. Id. at 162.
58. Id.
59. 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984).
60. Id. at 822.
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While the facts and posture of the case might permit one to
characterize Fine Arts as a UCC case, the language of the opin-
ion does not suggest such a limited scope. Indeed, the Fine
Arts litigation originally involved parties whose contracts were
clearly outside the scope of the UCC, and the opinion included
comments regarding the duties of some of those parties, in-
cluding the architect. 6' This holding affirmed the validity of
contract analysis in Minnesota commercial cases.
The more recent case of S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale
Helicopter Corp.62 provides a compelling policy justification for
the exclusivity of the contract remedy. In Groves, the court
ruled that negligence and strict liability claims were not avail-
able to the owner of a helicopter which had crashed, even
though the pilot had been killed. The supreme court reasoned
that the heirs of the pilot were permitted to proceed on tort
theories because their claims came outside the realm of war-
ranty. The owner of the helicopter, however, was a "commer-
cial plaintiff with economic bargaining power substantially
equivalent to that of the seller."-63 The court perceived no pol-
icy reason to permit such a plaintiff to do better in tort theory
than in contract theory. The Groves case refused to "emascu-
late" the Uniform Comercial Code, which the court recognized
as an expression of legislative intent.64 The fundamental rea-
son for refusing to recognize the tort recovery for the owner of
the helicopter was that the owner was a "commercial entity
possessing bargaining power substantially equal to that of the
seller, clearly capable of negotiating a warranty against the
damage the defective product caused to itself ... ."65 This
reference to bargaining power is the same theme that inspired
the Lesmeister clarification of Northern Petrochemical.
61. Id. at 821-22. The fact that construction projects include many contracts
which are governed by the UCC provides a strong reason to maintain similar princi-
ples of contract law for other contracts which must be reconciled with the UCC
contracts.
62. 374 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. 1985).
63. Id. at 434.
64. Id. at 433.
65. Id. at 435. The court rejected an argument that the owner should be allowed
to pursue the tort claims because the damage was "sudden and calamitous." Id. The
court had avoided the issue in Fine Arts by concluding that the damage was not sud-
den or calamitous. 354 N.W.2d at 821. In S.1 Groves, the court noted doubt about
the value of the distinction and decided that the owner's commercial power war-
ranted the holding against tort recovery. 374 N.W.2d at 434-35.
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While Superwood, Fine Arts, and Groves are all technically UCC
cases, the language of each opinion applies to all commercial
contexts. Moreover, the policies expressed by each opinion
apply equally well to construction cases involving primarily a
refusal to permit tort law to circumvent negotiated warranties
and remedies.
Commercial loss claims in construction cases involve liabili-
ties which should be determined on the basis of contract rather
than negligence theories. Owners and developers are able to
bargain for their warranties, remedies, and expectations. De-
signers are in a position to negotiate terms of their employ-
ment and to obtain extra compensation for extra services.
Similarly, contractors and subcontractors compete in a market-
place which expects and permits them to submit their bid for
the cost of meeting the owner's expectations. Quotes for alter-
nates are common and often come as a result of contractor
suggestion. Designers and contractors are both in a position
to subcontract for areas outside their expertise. Ultimately,
there are few marketplaces that have more equality of bargain-
ing power. The reasoning of the court in Groves applies almost
by definition to the construction market.
The damage-to-other-property issue of Fine Arts also helps to
identify necessary limitations on the scope of contract law in
construction cases. To the extent that damage or injury occurs
which lies outside the normal bounds of construction con-
tracts, one might expect tort law to define the avenues of re-
covery. If a claim primarily involves disappointed expectations
that are part of a voluntary contractual relationship, however,
contract law should provide the justification, if any, for
recovery. 66
66. Cases from other jurisdictions that have reached decisions more or less on
point include: Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir.
1985) (applying Virginia law); Intamin, Inc. v. Figley-Wright Contractors, Inc., 605 F.
Supp. 707 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (applying Illinois law); R.H. Macy & Co. v. Williams Tile &
Terrazzo Co., 585 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Harbor Mechanical, Inc. v. Arizona
Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 496 F. Supp. 681 (D. Ariz. 1980); State of Idaho v. Mitchell
Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1985) (disallowing negligence and strict
liability actions for economic loss); Bates & Rogers Constr. Corp. v. North Shore
Sanitary Dist., 128 Ill. App. 3d 962, 471 N.E.2d 915 (1984) (disallowing economic
loss on a negligence theory), aff'don other grounds, 486 N.E.2d 902 (1985) (disallowing
delay damages due to clause in contract relied upon in third-party beneficiary analy-
sis); R.J. Reagan Co. v. Kent, 654 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Bernard John-
son, Inc. v. Continental Constructors, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982);
Valley Landscape Co., Inc., v. Rolland, 218 Va. 257, 237 S.E.2d 120 (1977); Hogan v.
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C. Policy Reasons For Contract Theory
1. Variety of Roles
To date, the Minnesota Supreme Court has had little occa-
sion to discuss the possibility that the liabilities of design pro-
fessionals depend upon their particular roles. To illustrate,
architects not only design; architects also inspect, observe or,
on occasion, supervise; architects adjudicate differences be-
tween owners and contractors; and architects act as agents for
owners. Minnesota's opinions in construction disputes involv-
ing architects and engineers have not differentiated between
these roles in defining duties and liabilities.
Some cases from other jurisdictions have acknowledged the
different roles and have set forth distinct theories and meas-
ures of liability for each. 67 Many opinions recognize that archi-
tects act as independent contractors in the preparation of plans
and specifications. Most theories which recognize this capacity
compare with Minnesota's theories. In observing, inspecting,
or supervising the construction work, the architect acts as an
agent of the owner. This role brings into play certain rules of
agency and might obligate the architect differently than his
role as designer. The architect will also often act as arbiter in
resolving disputes between the owner and the contractor.
Some courts consider the architect in this capacity to be a
quasi-judicial officer with limited immunity.68
In the current world of construction, the roles of architects
Postin, 695 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1985) (relying on the disclosed-principal concept). See
also Maine Design, Inc. v. Zigler Shipyards, 791 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1986) (architect's
claim against builder for failure to return drawings sounded in quasi-contract rather
than tort).
67. See, e.g., Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962); Craviolini v.
Scholer & Fuller Assoc. Architects, 89 Ariz. 24, 357 P.2d 611 (1960); Huber, Hunt &
Nichols, Inc. v. Moore, 67 Cal. App. 3d 278, 136 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1977).
68. Several jurisdictions have examined the question of architectural immunity.
See, e.g., Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Engineers Inc., 775 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1985)
(applying Illinois law) (engineer has conditional privilege to interfere with subcon-
tractor's contract); Ballou v. Basic Constr. Co., 407 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. 1969); Lund-
gren, 307 F.2d at 104; Detweiler Bros., Inc. v. John Graham & Co., 412 F. Supp. 416
(E.D. Wash. 1976); John W. Johnson, Inc. v. Basic Constr. Co., 292 F. Supp. 300
(D.D.C.), aft'd, 429 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Craviolini, 89 Ariz. at 27-28, 357 P.2d
at 613-14; Huber, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 299-301, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 616-17.
The Minnesota Supreme Court discussed immunity of accountants acting as ar-
bitrators in Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364 (1955). In that
case, the supreme court concluded that the accountant was acting merely as a valuer
and not an arbitrator and, accordingly, did not enjoy any quasi-judicial immunity.
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are even more varied than those reflected in the existing case
law. In design-build teams, architects and engineers are often
employed by contractors, not owners. In some cases, archi-
tects work for owners, while engineers work for contractors or
subcontractors. In fast-track construction projects, traditional
roles have limited validity.
The variability of responsibilities of architects and engineers
provides a very good reason to maintain the Minnesota rule
that the duties and liabilities of design professionals must be
defined by contract. What the parties to one construction pro-
ject may require of a structural engineer may be very different
from what different parties require for another project.
Liability theories should account for the realities and vari-
abilities of the construction process. Where the claim attaches
to an architect's performance as an arbiter, for example, the
standard should more properly reflect the limited immunity
that such a role should carry with it. In circumstances where
the contract calls for specific, non-professional undertakings, a
breach of contract may be found without negligence. An engi-
neering firm's duties to a contractor may be different from its
duties to an architect or owner.
2. Availability of Third-Party Beneficiary Theory
It is a commonplace truism today that the privity defense is
eroding. One may inquire whether owners or design profes-
sionals face exposure to claims for economic losses from con-
tractors and subcontractors even if they have had no
contractual relationships with such parties. 69 Cases from other
jurisdictions permit such claims.
7
0
69. See generally Peck and Hoch, Liability of Engineers for Structural Design Errors:
State of the Art Considerations in Defining the Standard of Care, 30 VILL. L. REV. 403 (1983);
Note, The Crumbling Tower of Architectural Immunity: Evolution and Expansion of the Liability
to Third Parties, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 217 (1984).
70. See, e.g., Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. John C. Morris Assocs., 175 N.J. Super.
341, 418 A.2d 1290 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980), aff'd, 199 N.J. Super. 498, 489
A.2d 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985). The court assumed the design profes-
sional owed a duty to bidders to supply them with drawings prepared in accordance
with the standard of the profession. With that assumption and others, the court inev-
itably concluded that the design professional is answerable in tort to a contractor
who sustains economic damages as a result of the negligence of the design profes-
sional. The difficulty is that the court's initial assumption should have been tested.
In Minnesota, the owner is subject to an implied warranty that its specifications
are suitable. See, e.g., McCree & Co. v. State, 253 Minn. 295, 310-11, 91 N.W.2d 713,
723 (1958). The design professional, however, is not subject to the same implied
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Some who argue in support of allowing negligence actions in
construction litigation assume, incorrectly, that such actions
provide the only avenue for recovery beyond a strict identifica-
tion of parties in contractual privity. First, the suggestion that
the liability theory in a construction setting is founded upon
negligence principles need not automatically imply the aban-
donment of privity requirements. More importantly, the third-
party beneficiary doctrine entitles intended beneficiaries to en-
force contractual obligations or remedies despite the absence
of formal privity. This doctrine, rather than a limitless negli-
gence theory, should be the focus of attention for commercial
cases in which parties not in privity seek recovery of economic
loss.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the provisions
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979)
concerning third-party beneficiaries of contract, in Cretex Cos. v.
Construction Leaders.71 Cretex expanded the availability of third-
party beneficiary claims as compared to prior Minnesota law.
Section 302 defines an intended beneficiary, one who can seek
to enforce contractual liabilities, as follows:
Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recog-
nition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appro-
priate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obli-
gation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary, or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends
to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance.72
The first factor specified in section 302 should not be over-
looked. General conditions, made a part of the contract docu-
ments, frequently specify that no contractual relation exists
between, for example, the architects and contractors or be-
tween the owner and subcontractors. 73
Where agreements do not negate consideration of third-
warranty. Walyarvi, 263 N.W.2d at 425. Moreover, the owner's entitlement to in-
demnity for negligence on the part of the designer will depend upon the nature of
the economic loss and the contractural relationship between owner and designer.
Zontelli, 373 N.W.2d at 755.
71. 342 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Minn. 1984).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979).
73. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT
FOR CONSTRUCTION, AIA Doc. No. A-201, 1.1.2 (1976).
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party beneficiaries, the other factors can be considered. Decid-
ing whether recognition of a right "is appropriate" vests the
courts with considerable discretion. Determining whether
"the circumstances indicate" intent to benefit calls into play all
the attendant circumstances, including the inquiry as to whom
performance is to be rendered.7 4 The "duty owed" is separate
from the "intent to benefit." 7
5
To date, Minnesota courts have not been called upon to ex-
plore in detail the extent to which owners, contractors, design
professionals, suppliers, and other parties to the construction
process can take advantage of third-party beneficiary theories.
The extent to which it is appropriate to recognize a right of
performance will vary with the nature of the dealings and
contracts.
It seems certain that parties to some construction projects
will succeed in enforcing the contracts of others despite a lack
of privity. Not all cases stem from formally-bid projects with
general conditions that specify that contracts do not exist be-
tween design professionals and contractors or subcontractors.
In design-build and fast-track projects, architects, contractors,
and developers often have a mutual responsibility to cooperate
in the consummation of a project. Third-party beneficiary ob-
ligations may be entirely appropriate in many design-build or
fast-track projects.
Some cases from other jurisdictions have permitted contrac-
tors to sue design professionals where the contractor can
demonstrate a clear causal connection between design errors
and contractor losses. 76 The better reasoned of these cases,
however, permit such claims only with careful attention to the
entire set of contract documents. 77
74. Cretex, 342 N.W.2d at 137-40. See also Buchman Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of Minnesota, 298 Minn. 328, 335-36, 215 N.W.2d 479, 483-84
(1974); Chard Realty, Inc. v. City of Shakopee, 392 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986); Twin City Constr. Co. of Fargo v. ITT Indus. Credit Co., 358 N.W.2d 716,
718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Julian Johnson Constr. Corp. v. Parranto, 352 N.W.2d
808, 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
75. Cretex, 342 N.W.2d at 138, 139.
76. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council v. Clark-Dietz, 550 F.Supp. 610 (N.D. Miss.
1982); State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984).
77. See, e.g., Huber, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 603. See also Heritage
Pools v. Foothills Metro. Recreation, 701 P.2d 1260 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (subcon-
tractor not a third-party beneficiary of prime contractor's contract); Donovan v. Roth,
700 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (owner not a third-party beneficiary of subcon-
tractor's contract).
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The detailed provisions of the contract documents reflect
expectations and practices of construction project participants
which bear on both the "duty owed" and the "intent to bene-
fit" tests. For example, many project manuals instruct contrac-
tors to identify ambiguities or errors prior to bids for any
needed clarifications or corrections. Nearly all contracts for
construction projects provide a change order procedure for
use during the construction process to cover any latent errors,
omissions, or required changes. Where contractors have failed
to avail themselves of such nonjudicial remedies during the
project, absent justification, recognition of extra-contractual
rights may not be appropriate. Contractors who have no right
to additional compensation from owners obviously do not de-
serve a second bite at the apple against designers.
A California appellate court allowed, in theory, a contractor
to pursue economic loss claims against an architect in Huber,
Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Moore. 78 The Huber court conditioned
such claims upon proof that the contractor had made an accu-
rate original estimate, that the design contained an error, that
the error caused the contractor's loss, and that the damages
could not have been compensated for by the change order pro-
cess. 79 For the circumstances of that case, including the terms
of the project manual, the case imposed sensible conditions
upon the contractor's recovery. In Minnesota, these factors
would be germane to the determination of whether recogni-
tion of third-party beneficiary rights are appropriate to effectu-
ate the intention of the parties.80
78. 67 Cal. App. 3d 278, 136 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1977).
79. Id. at 301-03, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18.
80. Contractual obligations do not exhaust the exposure of design professionals.
The nature of the injury or damage bears on the theory of liability. For obvious
policy reasons, the courts uniformly permit persons not in privity with architects and
engineers to recover damages for personal injury caused by an unsafe design. One
duty which designers may seldom avoid by contract is the duty to exercise reasonable
care, skill, and diligence for the personal safety of foreseeable users. See, e.g., Ste-
phen v. Stems, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984) (tenant sued architect for injuries
sustained from fall down a stairwell without a handrail); Hiatt v. Brown, 422 N.E.2d
736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (patron of airport injured by blast from jet aircraft sued
architect). These observations must be qualified.
Where workplace injuries are concerned, courts do recognize contractual and
common law responsibilities and limitations. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHI-
TECTS, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION, AIA Doc. No. 201 (General Condi-
tions) 101.1, 102.1 (1976). When the design professional undertakes to protect
workers on the project, reasonable care must be exercised for their safety. Simon v.
Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 189 Neb. 183, 191, 202 N.W.2d 157, 163 (1972). There is,
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In any event, if a court permits a third party to present a
claim in the absence of privity, the third party should have no
better rights against the obligor than the party who is in priv-
ity. This should be true whether one relies on third-party ben-
eficiary theory or some other rationale. To effecuate the
expectation of the parties, one must recognize that design pro-
fessionals will measure their duties under their contracts with
their clients. If contractors are found to be legitimate third-
party beneficiaries of a design professional's duty to an owner,
the scope of the duty should be defined as if the owner were
the aggrieved party, either directly or for an indemnity claim.
Close attention to contractual relationships does not
necesarily mean that design professionals will be indifferent to
the fate of contractors or subcontractors merely because they
have no mutual contracts. Contractual obligations to indem-
nify and third-party beneficiary concepts may generate liabili-
ties which, in effect, result in payments to parties with whom
one had no privity.8 1 On the other hand, clarity of analysis and
fairness are enhanced if courts do not attempt to imply con-
tractual obligations that did not exist in the dealings of the
parties.
3. Misrepresentation Still Available
Increasing attention to the theories of fraud and misrepre-
sentation has followed the Superwood constraints upon the
availability of negligence claims.82 The elements of fraud have
been itemized in various ways, but the elements include at least
the following:
1. False representations;
2. [M]ade with the intent to deceive;
3. [P]laintiffs took action or refrained from taking action
in reliance on these misstatements;
4. [R]esulting in damages;
however, no common law duty upon the design professional to ensure construction
safety. Brown v. Gamble Constr. Co., 537 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976);
Luterbach v. Mochon, Schutte, Hackworthy, Juerisson, Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 267
N.W.2d 13, 16 (1978).
This article is not intended to address claims involving personal injury, but only
claims involving economic loss.
81. See, e.g., Hogan, 695 P.2d at 1042 (disclosed-principal concept precludes ar-
chitect's liability to contractor; court also acknowledged likelihood that architect
might be held to indemnify the owner).
82. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
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5. [W]hich are proximately caused by the mis-
statements.83
The scienter element can be satisfied in the case of intentional
misrepresentation or in certain cases of negligence.
84
Even if one accepts contract law as the exclusive avenue of
liability analysis for economic loss cases in the commercial set-
ting, one cannot dispense with the law of fraud and misrepre-
sentation. The essential policy reason in favor of contract law
is to recognize the bargained-for expectations of the parties.
To preserve the integrity of the bargaining process, the courts
should be prepared to enforce the tort remedies for misrepre-
sentation that affects the inducement or terms of the contract.
If false representations compromise the integrity of the bar-
gain, it is only proper to provide parties with extra-contractual
relief.8
5
While most allegations of fraud involve affirmative misstate-
ments, the Minnesota Supreme Court has also permitted re-
covery for fraudulent omissions. As a general rule, there is no
duty to disclose information.8 6 The court qualifies this, how-
83. Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp., 292 Minn. 334, 349, 197 N.W.2d 448, 457
(1972). A more rigorous, and preferable, statement of the elements can be found in
Davis v. Re-Trac Mfg. Corp., 276 Minn. 116, 117, 149 N.W.2d 37, 39 (1967) (relying
upon and clarifying the Hanson elements). See also Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bu-
reau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 175 (8th Cir. 1971).
84. See Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986); Control Data Corp.
v. Garrison, 305 Minn. 347, 233 N.W.2d 740 (1975).
85. See Northern States Power Co. v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 550 F.
Supp. 108 (D. Minn. 1982). See generally Clements Auto Co., 444 F.2d at 190 (where
misrepresentation by data processing company that its services could provide effec-
tive inventory control for wholesale supply companies was established, trial court did
not abuse its discretion in awarding damages).
One should not permit the law of misrepresentation to supplant contract law.
Lewis v. Axinn, 100 A.D.2d 617, 473 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). Claims of
fraud should be tested with skepticism, particularly where the specifications call for
requirements and are not expressed as representations of material fact. In Jasper
Constr., Inc. v. Foothill Junior College Dist., 91 Cal. App. 3d 1 (1979), a California
appellate court properly held that, absent intentional concealment or active misrep-
resentation, a contractor may not recover for "error and omissions" in plans and
specifications.
Misrepresentation is not necessarily the only tort theory that may come into play.
In Skepton v. County of Bucks, Pa., 628 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Pa. 1986), a federal dis-
trict court denied a motion to dismiss a claim against a structural engineering firm
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff claimed that the structural engineering firm
conspired with government officials to terminate a contract of a general contractor
who threatened to publicize inadequacies in a building project.
86. Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 422, 196 N.W.2d 619, 622
(1972).
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ever, by requiring disclosure of information necessary to pre-
vent statements made from being misleading. 7 Also, the court
recognizes a duty to disclose in cases involving fiduciary obli-
gation or other similar circumstances. 88 In the construction
context, an owner may have occasion to rely upon design pro-
fessionals in relationships tantamount to fiduciary relation-
ships. Contractors and subcontractors will rarely occupy a
similar relationship with design professionals. Numerous Min-
nesota cases permit contractors to obtain additional recovery
from owners on the basis of misrepresentations as to con-
cealed conditions.8 9 The Minnesota Supreme Court has recog-
nized that owners impliedly warrant that plans and
specifications are sufficient for construction by a contractor.
One should consider these implied warranties with care, how-
ever, when studying any particular case. Contract documents
may impose a duty upon a contractor or its subcontractors to
obtain independent verification prior to bid.90 There may be
contractual remedies available for errors, omissions, or incon-
sistancies in the plans and specifications. It is the custom for
most designers and contractors to anticipate oversights and er-
rors in design documents. If the construction contract docu-
ments adequately accommodate errors, then courts should not
hastily embrace the application of fraud theories as an end-run
on the construction contracts.
The Fine Arts opinion discussed the contention that the man-
ufacturer owed a duty to warn users of special precautions for
the use of the glazed bricks.9 1 The supreme court rejected this
argument, not because it was unavailable as a theory, but
rather because the facts did not support liability under such an
analysis. The court cited the proposition that "there is no duty
to warn if the user knows or should know of potential dan-
ger." 92 The facts of Fine Arts persuaded the court that the ar-
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See infra note 95.
90. In Megary Bros., Inc. v. State, 291 Minn. 12, 188 N.W.2d 919 (1971), the
supreme court rejected a claim by a contractor for extra compensation for facts
equally susceptible of discovery by the owner and the contractor. Under the con-
tract, the contractor had the duty to discover and correct errors. However, the
supreme court did not allow the contractor to claim reliance on representations it
had an opportunity and duty to test.
91. Fine Arts, 354 N.W.2d at 821-22.
92. Id. at 821.
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chitects employed by the owner should have known of the risks
of glazed brick and of the proper procedures to avoid those
risks. The owner, charged with the knowledge and actions of
its agents, the architects, could not take advantage of the duty
to warn theory. In dicta, the court concluded:
Absent an "unreasonably dangerous condition" created by
a manufacturer's failure to warn which the jury determined
was not here present, or absent misrepresentations made by
the manufacturer which [the owner] has not here alleged,
the action for failure to warn of the sensitive nature of the
brick is precluded by warranty or contract law, which pro-
vides the only remedies for a consumer's disappointed
expectations.93
This is somewhat surprising. As discussed, the supreme court
has established a duty to disclose when circumstances indicate
some special duties to disclose material information, even in
the absence of affirmative misrepresentations. 94 Fine Arts
seems to foreclose such duties in the commercial loss context.
On the facts of that particular case, the result appears correct,
but different facts might indicate a different result.
95
93. Id. at 822.
94. Klein, 293 Minn. at 422, 196 N.W.2d at 622.
95. Design professionals regularly rely upon manufacturers for information
about the performance of their product. The Restatement of Torts defines a poten-
tial liability theory for those who supply incorrect information negligently in connec-
tion with a business enterprise. The Restatement provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business profession or employment,
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their busi-
ness transaction, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to
them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or commu-
nicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsection
(1) is limited to loss suffered:
(a) By the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) Through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or
in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a policy duty to give the informa-
tion extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for
whose benefit the duty is created, and any of the transaction in
which it is intended to protect them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522.
The duty defined in this section tracks rather closely with Minnesota law and with
third-party beneficiary theory. Minnesota adopted these general principles in
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4. Resolution of Confusion Regarding Statute of Limitations
The choice of liability theory for commercial loss cases may
determine the applicable statute of limitations. In some cases,
claims which would be timely under one theory are untimely if
considered under another theory.
Superwood 96 provides an obvious example of the importance
of the applicable doctrine. In Superwood, the court recognized
that claims for damages were unavailable under any warranty
theory by the expiration of the UCC statute of limitations.
97
Had the court elected to permit claims in negligence or strict
liability, the claims would have been allowed.
98
A similar contrast in results may be postulated for commer-
cial cases not governed by the UCC. Both the statute of limita-
tions for general contract actions and the statute for general
negligence actions run six years from the date that the causes
of action accrue, 99 but the action may be said to accrue at a
different point in time depending upon whether it is character-
ized as a claim in contract or in negligence.
The statute of limitations for general contract actions in
Minnesota is six years.100 The statute does not specify when
the limitations period begins to run, but the Minnesota
Supreme Court has said that "a cause of action for breach of
contract accrues immediately on a breach, though actual dam-
ages resulting therefrom do not occur until afterwards."' 0' l
Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 122, 248 N.W.2d 291, 298-99 (1976). See also
Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 175 (Minn. 1986).
96. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981).
97. Id. at 160.
98. See id. at 162.
99. See MINN. STAT. § 541.05 (1984) (six-year period for general contract ac-
tions); id. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (six-year period for negligence actions).
100. MINN. STAT. § 541.05.
101. Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co., 201 Minn. 171, 176, 275 N.W. 694,
697 (1937). See also Karels v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 371 N.W.2d 617, 619
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (statute of limitations begins to run on date of accident rather
than time of compliance with insurance company policies); Juster Steel v. Carlson
Cos., 366 N.W.2d 616, 617-18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (statute of limitations begins to
run when the breach occurs).
For design professionals, an analogy can be made to the commencement of limi-
tation periods for other professionals such as physicians and attorneys. For physi-
cians, the cause of action accrues when the treatment for the particular condition
ceases. Gondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982); Johnson v. Win-
throp Labs. Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 291 Minn. 145, 147, 190 N.W.2d 77, 80
(1971); Miller v. Mercy Medical Center, 380 N.W.2d 827, 830 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
For attorneys, the point is not settled. In Marker v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4
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This can mean that a contract action can accrue before one
notices economic loss or other damage.
This contrasts with the rule that applies to negligence ac-
tions. The statute of limitations for negligence actions is also
six years. 0 2 The supreme court, however, has stated that "an
action for negligence cannot be maintained, nor does the stat-
ute of limitations begin to run, until damage has resulted from
the alleged negligence."' 1 3 Although there is ordinarily a co-
incidence of the negligence with the appearance of damages,
this is not always the case. In construction cases, it is not un-
common for an unsafe or defective condition of a building to
result in actual damage only after the passage of time, the op-
eration of weather, or certain loading conditions.
Many economic loss claims will be said to accrue earlier if
the claim is found in a contract action than if the claim is found
in negligence. Generally, for cases of contract and negligence,
ignorance of a cause of action not involving continuing negli-
gence or fraud on the part of the defendant does not toll the
statute of limitations.' 0 4 Doubt as to the correct characteriza-
tion of a claim casts doubt on the timeliness of certain actions.
Cases involving fraud operate somewhat differently. The
(Minn. 1981), the trial court had followed the rule that the statute begins to run on
the date of the negligent act and not when the harm is suffered or discovered. The
supreme court affirmed on other grounds and did not comment on the statute of
limitations issue. Id. at 6. In Reliance Ins. Co. v. Arneson, 322 N.W.2d 604 (Minn.
1982), the court determined an insurance coverage issue indirectly addressing the
statute of limitations issue. Id. at 606-07.
In Grimm v. O'Connor, 392 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), the court of
appeals stated that a cause of action for legal malpractice does not accrue until dam-
age occurs, but also noted that the statute runs even though the ultimate damage is
unknown or unpredictable. Id. at 43. In that case, a client complained that a settle-
ment negotiated by his attorney cost him interest. The court of appeals held that the
terms of the settlement were known to the client from its original date and that the
statute of limitations had run. Id. The court of appeals seemed to apply the tort
determination of the accrual of an action but the same result would have obtained
had the contract rules been applied.
102. MINN. STAT. § 541.05, subd. 1 (5).
103. Reliance Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d at 604; Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280 Minn.
147, 153, 158 N.W.2d 580, 584 (1968).
104. Toombs v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 801, 809 (Minn. 1985). See also Wild v.
Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 449-50, 234 N.W.2d 775, 794-95 (1975) (fraudulent conceal-
ment will toll statute of limitations until discovery or reasonable opportunity to dis-
cover). The doctrine of equitable estoppel may toll the running of the applicable
statute of limitations for either contract or negligence actions. See, e.g., Bethesda Lu-
theran Church v. Twin City Constr., 356 N.W.2d 344, 349-50 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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statute of limitations applicable to fraud claims is six years.1 0 5
The six-year period begins to run when the facts constituting
fraud were discovered or, by reasonable diligence, should have
been discovered. 1
06
Considerable attention has been directed recently to section
541.051 of the Minnesota Statutes, 0 7 a special statute for im-
provments to real property. 08 For purposes of this discussion,
it is necessary only to comment that the statute applies simi-
larly to actions in contract or tort.10 9 Because section 541.051
provides a limitations period which is premised upon discovery
of the defective or unsafe condition,"10 the operation of this
statute will be entirely different than the statute applicable to
general contract or negligence actions, which do not turn upon
discovery."l ' Only fraud is specified as an exception to the
running of section 541.051.112
III. APPLICATION OF COMPARATIVE FAULT
A. Generally
Understanding whether commercial loss cases are to be ana-
lyzed in terms of contract or tort is important for a proper eco-
nomic loss allocation. Minnesota practitioners have grown
relatively comfortable with the modified comparative fault
scheme established in section 604.01 of the Minnesota Stat-
utes. 113 More than one recent appellate opinion reveals that
trial lawyers and judges have relied on comparative fault prin-
ciples to test commercial loss cases, although the appellate
courts reject the analysis as a general rule. "1 The appellate
courts prefer the notion that general economic damages in
105. MINN. STAT. § 541.05, subd. 1 (6).
106. Toombs, 361 N.W.2d at 808-09. In Toombs, the court noted that "delay in dis-
covering fraud may be excusable when a confidential relationship exists." Id. at 809.
107. MINN. STAT. § 541.051.
108. See, e.g., Lovgren v. People's Elec. Co., 380 N.W.2d 791, 794-96 (Minn.
1986); Schwardt v. Modem Grain Sys., Inc., 390 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986); Bulau v. Hector Plumbing & Heating Co., 387 N.W.2d 659, 661-63 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986).
109. MINN. STAT. § 541.051(1).
110. Id.
111. See id. (limitation period begins to run at discovery of defect); id. § 541.05,
subd. 1(1), (5) (limitation period not tied to discovery of defect).
112. Id. § 541.051, subd. 1(6).
113. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1984).
114, See Lesmeister, 330 N.W.2d at 102.
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contract cases should be analyzed without reference to com-
parative fault principles. The rules are confusing and, at times,
overlapping claims can lead to inherent contradictions in a sin-
gle case.
This section of this Article will review the rules that come to
us from the leading Minnesota cases on loss allocation. One
should not expect a simple, unyielding rule for all cases. Care-
ful consideration of the reasons for the rules, however, will help
practitioners reach the proper result even in the absence of
clear precedents.
The thoughtful and provocative opinion of Justice Simonett
in Peterson v. Bendix Home Systems, Inc. 115 sets the background for
the line drawing that defines the limits of comparative fault.
The focus of that case involved a warranty claim that formalde-
hyde fumes had made a mobile home uninhabitable.' 16 Justice
Simonett explained the history and nature of warranty claims:
Originally warranty actions were seen as tortlike breaches of
the seller's representations and assurances to the buyer, but
their central role in sales law led them to be treated more
generally as an element of contract law. Thus, warranties
evolved as a unique amalgam of tort and contract law. As
warranty began to be used more and more to cover conse-
quential harms caused by defective products, however, the
tortlike nature of the actions was increasingly emphasized.
So, in a leading Minnesota case abolishing privity require-
ments for breach of warranty actions, the tort basis of war-
ranty was used to establish that a buyer could sue a
manufacturer for a defective project, even though the
buyer's "contract" has been with the seller-dealer and not
the manufacturer. * * * Then, in 1978, our comparative
negligence statute was amended to include fault, and
"fault" was defined as including, among other things,
breach of warranty and misuse of product." 17
The opinion went on to note that contributory negligence
clearly stood as "a defense to a breach of warranty action inso-
far as consequential damages are concerned.""" This obser-
vation derived from the tort-like origin of consequential
damages.
115. 318 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 1982).
116. Id. at 51-52.
117. Id. at 52 (citation omitted).
118. Id. at 53.
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The issue in Peterson dealt with the applicability of compara-
tive fault for nonconsequential damages.19 After considera-
tion of the precedents and the logic of contract actions, the
court concluded that claims for general and incidental dam-
ages are not subject to comparative fault.' 20 The court ex-
plained: "The buyer is seeking a remedy for a bad bargain, a
matter more like contract, not for consequential damages re-
sulting from a bad product, a matter more like tort."' 12 Thus,
although the jury had concluded that the plaintiff's fault ex-
ceeded the fault of the manufacturer, which foreclosed any
award of consequential damages, the supreme court affirmed
an award of direct and incidental damages.
122
The Peterson holding could be read to cover not only breach
of warranty actions, but also other contract actions. Les-
meister' 23 recognized that the comparative fault "statute was
not intended to apply generally to contract cases."'' 24 This ob-
servation came, however, without any reference to the Peterson
opinion. However, the Lesmeister court applied rules of law that
were generally consistent with Peterson. For example, although
the Lesmeister opinion observed at one point that allocation of
fault in a contract action would be reversible error, 25 the opin-
ion also reduced the plaintiff's recovery of consequential dam-
ages because of his fault in causing them. 126 The opinion
expressed an apology for the confused procedural posture and
119. Id.
120. Id. at 53-54.
121. Id. at 54.
122. Id. at 55.
123. 330 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1983).
124. 330 N.W.2d at 101.
125. Id. at 102. Later in the opinion, the court discussed the damages.
126. Id. at 103. The court explained:
Lesmeister should not necessarily recover all his consequential damages.
He was under a duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate his damages.
[B]ecause Lesmeister participated in construction of the building and or-
dered work done in a way inconsistent with good workmanlike practices, we
believe the loss of the expected value should be treated not as a general
damage but as another item of consequential damage subject to reduction
for his failure to mitigate damages. Where his actions helped to cause the
loss of the expected value of the building, Lesmeister ought not be allowed
to shift the whole loss onto Monarch. We conclude that Lesmeister's total
damages are $102,064. This award should be reduced by the percentage of
fault attributable to Lesmeister for failure to mitigate his damages, i.e., 42.11
percent.
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the unique law of the case, which bears attention. 27 Even
though the Lesmeister opinion provides observations which have
apparent application outside that case, we must wait for the
supreme court to tell us what we may rely upon and what is not
consistent with other accepted principles in this state.
The supreme court missed an opportunity to provide some
clarification in Zontelli. 128 As had been discussed, the court of
appeals rejected comparative fault for a breach of contract ac-
tion, citing the Lesmeister "holding" as a persuasive although
not precedential opinion. 29 The supreme court reversed, but
approved of the apppeals court's determination that the city's
liability to the contractor was contractual, citing Lesmeister.' 30
The supreme court also rejected the application of compara-
tive fault to the contractor's claims. 13 ' The supreme court did
this without reference to the analysis of the court of appeals,
however, and expressed its ruling narrowly by concluding that
the specific factors mentioned by the trial court were "inappro-
priate to support a finding of either fault or a failure to miti-
gate damages."'' 32 Absent from the opinion is any declaration
whether a finding of fault or a failure to mitigate damages, if
properly proven, is relevant or whether comparative fault can re-
duce contractual claims for damages. Nor did the court at-
tempt to characterize the damages as direct or consequential.
If the principles of Peterson apply generally, as they should,
then it would seem that failure to mitigate damages, if properly
proven, should be relevant as a defense to a claim for conse-
quential damages. The question is more subtle as to direct
damages.
The question of failure to mitigate damages warrants careful
consideration in direct damages analysis for construction claim
cases. Direct damages have been defined as:
[E]ither the cost of reconstruction in accordance with the
contract, if this is possible without unreasonable economic
waste, or the difference in the value of the building as con-
tracted for and the value as actually built, if reconstruction
127. Id. at 10.
128. 373 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1985).
129. Zontelli & Sons v. City of Nashwauk, 353 N.W.2d 600 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
130. 373 N.W.2d at 751.
131. Id. at 754.
132. Id.
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would constitute unreasonable waste.133
For contrast, we can compare the types of damages generally
classed as consequential:
In addition, non-breaching parties should recover damages
sustained by reason of the breach which arose naturally
from the breach or could reasonably be supposed to have
been contemplated by the parties when making the contract
as the probable result of the breach.
134
In a construction claim arising out of the defective condition of
a building, the measure of direct damages relates to the condi-
tion of the building, while the measure of consequential dam-
ages addresses the foreseeable consequences of a defective
building, such as lost rents.
13 5
If the direct damages having to do with the condition of the
building are measured at the time of the breach,1 36 then it is
unlikely that the owner's conduct will bear on the extent of the
damage. On the other hand, if one measures direct damages
at a later point, such as the date of discovery of deterioration
or the date of repairs, then the owner's comparative fault hav-
ing to do with maintenance or delayed repairs would be rele-
vant. In Peterson, the court preferred to address the damage
issue at the time and place of acceptance.' 3 7 In other words,
damages are to be awarded for loss in value or cost of repair
required at the time of delivery, not for any loss incurred sub-
sequently due to misuse or assumption of risk.' 38 This rule
133. Northern Petrochemical, 297 Minn. at 124, 211 N.W.2d at 165. See also Asp v.
O'Brien, 277 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Minn. 1979) (measure of damages applies whether
the breach of contract is functional or cosmetic); Johnson v. Garages, Etc., Inc., 367
N.W.2d 85, 86 (Minn. 1985) (measure of damages applies whether the breach of
contract is functional or cosmetic).
This characterization of direct contract damages clearly is appropriate when the
subject of the breach is the contractor's performance. However, one might argue
that these types of damages are not direct but rather are consequential when one is
considering a design professional's contract. The designer promises to deliver a de-
sign in exchange for compensation. If the designer breaches the contract, the direct
damage might be said to be the difference in value of the design documents, with the
results in the building being consequential. This argument tends to introduce confu-
sion, however, and does not find any support in supreme court opinions to date.
134. Lesmeister, 330 N.W.2d at 103 (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156
Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)).
135. Id.
136. This is the same point in time at which breach of contract actions can be
commenced.
137. 318 N.W.2d at 56.
138. Id. at 54 n.2.
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should be followed in construction cases to preserve the integ-
rity of the "no comparative fault" idea for contract cases.
Those with experience in construction cases will recognize
that ascertaining differences in value or cost of repair as of the
date of building completion will often present severe eviden-
tiary difficulties. If courts are tempted to permit plaintiffs to
rely upon measurements of damage assembled at a time after
the building completion, then the court should put the plaintiff
to the burden of relating the damages to the original condition
of the building. If the courts are persuaded that damages hav-
ing to do with building conditions are inextricably related to
maintenance as well as construction practices, then it would
seem that comparative fault might be required for a fair alloca-
tion of responsibility. The point made in Peterson is to examine
the facts carefully to determine whether the law to be applied
is "inconsistent with the true facts." 139
Equally difficult evidentiary issues arise in cases in which two
or more defendants have breached independent contractual
duties. On this subject, the opinion of the supreme court in
Northern Petrochemical 140 is the leading authority. In that case,
the owner of a building sued for damages which resulted from
building settlement. 41 The court assumed that the independ-
ent breaches of contract by several parties to the construction
process, including the architect and the contractor, had caused
the plaintiff's 1oss. 142 In explaining loss allocation, the court
applied the "single injury" rule:
[W]here it is not reasonably possible to make a division of
the damage caused by separate acts of negligence, closely
related in point of time, the negligent parties, even though
they acted independently, are jointly and severally liable.143
There being no suggestion that the owner was at fault for the
damage, the court placed the burden upon the defendants to
show that the damage could be apportioned. 44 Failing such a
showing, each defendant would be fully liable for all of the
plaintiff's damages.14 5
139. Id. at 55.
140. 297 Minn. 118, 211 N.W.2d 159 (1973).
141. Id. at 121-23, 211 N.W.2d at 163-64.
142. See id. at 122-23, 211 N.W.2d at 164-65.
143. Id. at 128, 211 N.W.2d at 167.
144. Id. at 128-29, 211 N.W.2d at 167-68.
145. Id. at 128, 211 N.W.2d at 167.
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The Lesmeister opinion undertook to clarify the Northern Pe-
trochemical holding:
Where A and B owe contract duties to C under separate
contracts, and each breaches independently, and it is not
reasonably possible to make a divison of the damage caused
by the separate breaches closely related in point of time, the
breaching parties, even though they acted independently,
are jointly and severally liable. 1
46
Lesmeister added a footnote cautioning that the same rule might
not apply if one or both of the breaching parties intentionally
breach the contract.
147
A different rule might apply also if the facts showed that the
loss to be allocated was truly caused, in part, by the owner.
One example might involve an owner's intervention in a de-
sign decision with facts supporting an assumption of risk argu-
ment. Another example might include deferred maintenance
or actual building abuse with resulting aggravation of a prob-
lem. In such cases, law would be inconsistent with the true
facts if the owner were relieved of the consequences of its own
malfeasance. A preferable rule would be to require the appli-
cation of comparative fault. As discussed above, the timing of
the damages measure may have a direct bearing on the likeli-
hood that conduct of the owner is relevant in some cases.
One must note other qualificatons, as well. For example,
one can easily envision a case in which the breaches are not
independent. If a contractor has failed to follow specifications
or plans, and the only breach of contract by the inspecting ar-
chitect stems from failure to discover the contractor's error,
each of the parties might have contractual liability to the
owner. It would seem in this case, however, that the architect
should be entitled to indemnity from the contractor. 148
146. 330 N.W.2d at 102.
147. Id. at 102 n.6.
148. The leading case regarding indemnity in Minnesota is Hendrickson v. Minne-
sota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960). The court stated
that a party is entitled to indemnity in the following circumstances:
(1) Where the one seeking indemnity has only a derivative or vicarious lia-
bility for damage caused by the one sought to be charged.
(2) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability by action at the
direction, in the interest of, and in reliance upon the one sought to be
charged.
(3) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability because of a
breach of duty owed to him by the one sought to be charged.
(4) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability merely because
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Assessing the availability of indemnity (or contribution)
among defendants jointly liable for independent breaches also
creates problems. Should one compare the fault of the de-
fendants to each other? Given that the single injury rule is
borrowed from the law of tort, one might assume so, but there
is no answer for this in Minnesota cases as yet.
In Zontelli, the court put the burden on the engineer to prove
that its breach of contractual duty was not the cause of the
city's entire liability.149 This is a deviation from the normal al-
location of burden of proof at trial. Perhaps it seemed to the
court that putting the burden on the engineer flowed naturally
from Northern Petrochemical.'5 0 In that case, the supreme court
placed the burden on several defendants to show that the
plaintiff's damage could be apportioned.15 ' The burden indi-
cated in Zontelli, however, is conceptually different. For pur-
poses of the city's indemnity claim, there was one plaintiff and
one defendant. 5 2 Ordinarily, the plaintiff has the burden to
prove breach of duty, cause, and amount of damages. Essen-
tially, Zontelli reversed the ordinary burden of proof.t 53 This
author respectfully submits that the reference to the engineer's
burden in Zontelli was intended only for the rather specific facts
of that case.
Another application of comparative fault arises in economic
loss claims pursued on a negligent misrepresentation theory.
In Florenzano v. Olson,' 54 the Minnesota Supreme Court held
of failure, even though negligent, to discover or prevent the miscon-
duct of the one sought to be charged.
(5) Where there is an express contract between the parties containing an
explicit undertaking to reimburse for liability of the character involved.
Id. at 372-73, 104 N.W.2d at 848. In Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362
(Minn. 1977), the supreme court determined that contribution based upon relative
fault, not indemnity, should govern circumstances described in the fourth category of
Hendrickson. 255 N.W.2d at 366-67. To that extent, Tolbert reversed the Hendrickson
rule. The court has, however, sometimes left open the availability of indemnity in
cases which might be characterized as falling within the fourth category. See, e.g.,
Polaris Indus. v. Plastics, Inc., 299 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 1980); Frey v. Montgom-
ery Ward & Co., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 782, 788-89 (Minn. 1977). For an excellent dis-
cussion of these cases, see generally Steenson, The Fault with Comparative Fault: The
Problem of Individual Comparisons in a Modified Comparative Fault Jurisdiction, 12 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (1986).
149. 353 N.W.2d at 65.
150. Northern Petrochemical, 297 Minn. at 118, 211 N.W.2d at 159.
151. See id. at 128-29, 211 N.W.2d at 167-68.
152. Zontelli, 373 N.W.2d at 755.
153. Id. at 755-56.
154. 387 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986).
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that comparative fault applies to cases involving negligent mis-
representation.155 The court reserved for another day the
question for cases involving intentional misrepresentation.156
Most commercial loss cases will involve claims of negligent, as
opposed to intentional, misrepresentations.
B. Settlements and Releases
The supreme court's observations that construction liabili-
ties are a matter of contract and that comparative fault consid-
erations should not apply in such cases would seem to suggest
that Pierringer releases could not be useful. The central idea
of a Pierringer release is that the plaintiff agrees to discharge
the portion of his claim attributable to the comparative fault of
the settling defendant.157 The release normally applies only to
situations where the nonsettling defendants have contribution
claims against the settling defendant. In the construction con-
text, the crossclaims often involve indemnity claims based
upon contract.
In his groundbreaking article on Pierringer releases, then-
attorney Simonett described the "emergency of a 'comparative
indemnity' approach to replace traditional 'all or nothing in-
demnity.' "158 This explanation has proven prescient, for the
Minnesota Legislature in 1983 enacted a statute that limited
indemnity clauses in construction contracts. 59 The effect of
the statute is to transform indemnity clauses into contribution
clauses based upon comparative fault. This statute has not yet
been tested or explained in any appellate decisions, but the
new law confirms the thinking of Simonett that Pierringer re-
leases can be of use in some indemnity situations. He pointed
out that complete indemnity still applies for claims based on
vicarious liability. In such cases, he perceived that the strategy
considerations might vary, but he saw no reason to limit the
155. Id. at 176.
156. Id.
157. See Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978).
158. Simonett, Release of Joint Tortfeasors: Use of the Pierringer Release in Minnesota, 3
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1977).
159. Act of June 14, 1983, ch. 337, 1983 Minn. Laws 2135, 2136-37 (codified at
MINN STAT. §§ 337.01-.05 (1984)). See also Braegelmann v. Horizon Dev. Co., 371
N.W.2d 644 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (agreements which seek to indemnify a party for
losses resulting from that party's negligent acts are void and unenforceable in build-
ing and construction contracts).
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availability of the claims.' 60
The supreme court had an opportunity to consider the ap-
propriateness of Pierringer releases in construction contract
disputes in Barr/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto's, Inc. 161 In that case, the
plaintiff owner had sued a contractor and the contractor's
surety. The plaintiff settled with the contractor and released
claims against the surety for the acts of the contractor, but re-
tained claims against the surety based upon certain independ-
ent acts. The surety objected that the Pierringer release was
collusive and had the effect of juxtaposing the parties. With-
out any extended discussion, the court approved the release as
a settlement tool.
Under the circumstances of that case, the Barr/Nelson con-
clusion seems appropriate. Had the plaintiff attempted to set-
tle with the contractor and still pursue claims against the surety
for the acts of the contractor, however, analysis would have
been more difficult. Ordinarily, contractors undertake to in-
demnify their strategies. It would be difficult to conceive of a
rationale which would permit a plaintiff to settle with a con-
tractor, agree to indemnify the contractor, and yet have a claim
remaining against the surety for the acts of the contractor.
Since the surety would be entitled to indemnity from the con-
tractor, and the plaintiff is to indemnify the contractor, the
plaintiff's release of the contractor implies release of the
surety.
There are different situations, however, in which Pierringer
releases, coupled with appropriate assignments, make ample
sense. For example, if the plaintiff were to pursue a settlement
with a general contractor, and receive from the general con-
tractor an assignment of the general contractor's claims
against a subcontractor, it would seem that the plaintiff would
be able to settle with the contractor for that amount which was
owing for the contractor's responsibility and yet also step into
the contractor's shoes to press a claim for indemnity against
the subcontractor. Certain theoretical questions might be
raised to the effect that the assignment comes before a judicial
determination that the contractor is entitled to indemnity from
the subcontractor. On the other hand, given the practice and
virtual requirement of our courts that parties to construction
160. Simonett, supra note 158, at 25.
161. 336 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. 1983).
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disputes bring claims for contribution or indemnity before
they have technically accrued, and given the general favor in
which courts hold creative settlements, so long as they do not
prejudice the remaining parties, these objections should not be
sustained. So long as the subcontractor is asked to pay no
more than it would have paid had the contractor first been ad-
judged vicariously liable and then pursued indemnity, the com-
bination Pierringer release and assignment should be
approved.
To date, this author is aware of only one case in which an
agreement of this sort has been presented to the trial courts
for consideration. 62 A practical recommendation is that the
parties to these types of arrangements condition the agree-
ment upon formal court approval. Court approval is required
in any event to secure the dismissal of the released party, 163
and it is only logical to couch the agreement in language that
voids the agreement in the event that the courts are not per-
suaded that the arrangement is legitimate.
If a defendant is properly dismissed from a commercial loss
case in a Pierringer-type situation, the effect in trial is similar
to any other case. For example, in Rediske v. Minnesota Valley
Breeders Association,164 the court of appeals indicated that the
negligence of a contractor who had been dismissed from the
suit during trial should be submitted to the jury notwithstand-
ing the dismissal.165 If one were to assume that the court prop-
erly relied on negligence theory, then clearly Frey v.
Snelgrove 166 required presentation of the contractor's liability
to the jury. On the other hand, even if the only liability theory
was in contract, then the contractor's responsibility would be
relevant at least to the extent that plaintiff's damages were
consequential in nature.
IV. APPELLATE COURT APPLICATION OF TORT THEORY
IN COMMERCIAL Loss CASES
Different approaches in reconciling the concepts of negli-
gence and contract in construction project lawsuits can be seen
162. Hormel v. Best Wrecking Co., No. 44-84-1187, District of Minnesota, United
States District Court.
163. Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.01, 54.02.
164. 374 N.W.2d 745 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
165. 374 N.W.2d at 749.
166. 269 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 1978).
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in various opinions reported by the court of appeals. 67 These
opinions have been selected for discussion because they depart
from contract law and introduce tort concepts. In the main,
the result is confusion.
One case of interest is Rediske v. Minnesota Valley Breeders Asso-
ciation. 168 In that case, the court of appeals cited and relied
upon Lesmeister v. Dilly but did so in a ruling which is inconsis-
tent with Lesmeister.169 The plaintiffs in that case were farmers
who had suffered substantial economic losses as a result of the
failure of several defendants to complete a waste handling sys-
tem in a timely and proper manner. °7 0 The plaintiffs relied
upon theories of breach of contract, negligence, and misrepre-
sentation.' 71 The trial court submitted the negligence claims
against the defendant contractors to the jury. The court of ap-
peals rejected the argument of the defendants that Lesmeister
foreclosed the negligence theory. 72 The court of appeals
characterized the Lesmeister opinion as a case which ruled that
comparative fault was not applicable to contract cases, but not
one which "limited [the plaintiffs] to one theory of recov-
ery.' ' 173 The Rediske opinion cannot be reconciled with the lan-
guage of Lesmeister, nor can it be reconciled with Zontelli,
167. Several appellate opinions have noted that cases were tried without objection
on theories that did not properly apply. The resulting laws of the case bound the
parties, but limit the value of the opinions as precedent. See, e.g., Lesmeister, 330
N.W.2d at 100 (holding limited to facts with no precedential value as to theories of
relief or damages); McCarthy Well Co., Inc. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc., 389 N.W.2d
514, 517-18 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (submission of negligence claim rendered it
the law of the case); Bethesda Lutheran Church, 356 N.W.2d at 348 n. 1 (parties failed to
object to trial court's instructions on negligent breach of contract).
168. 374 N.W.2d 745 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
169. The court, in Rediske, recognized actions sounding in both negligence and
contract. Id. at 749-50.
170. Id. at 747.
171. See id. at 749.
172. Id.
173. Id. While the theory of misrepresentation, if properly alleged, might have
been available, the trial court and the court of appeals should have rejected the the-
ory of negligent breach of contract.
The Rediske opinion is flatly contrary to an earlier opinion of another panel in
Bethesda Lutheran Church, 356 N.W.2d at 348. That opinion stated in footnote 1:
The trial court submitted this case on the negligent breach of a contractual
duty theory and allowed the jury to compare the fault of the parties. Since
the trial, the Minnesota Supreme Court has clarified the law and indicated it
has not yet recognized that cause of action except in special circumstances.
No party objected to the trial court's instructions and thus the instructions
are the law of the case.
Id. at 348 (citations omitted).
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Superwood, Fine Arts, or SJ Groves. ' 74
The Rediske trial court refused defendants' request to submit
the case on a comparative fault basis. The court of appeals
ruled that this was error and remanded the case. In doing so,
the court of appeals directed the trial court to employ a special
verdict to separate out which damages were attributable to
breach of contract and which to negligence and fraud. The
court reasoned that only the negligence and fraud claims
should be subject to comparative fault.'
75
With the benefit of nothing more specific about the case
than the opinion of the court of appeals, this author will offer
an assessment of the rules that should have been applied in
Rediske. First, the evidence of negligent installation should
have been relevant only to prove breach of contract, not as an
independent tort issue. Contract liabilities should generally
have been determined among those in privity, with due recog-
nition for third-party beneficiary liabilities. Second, theories of
fraud or misrepresentation could have resulted in independent
orjoint and several liability of numerous defendants. Compar-
ative fault, including negligence in reliance would have applied
to claims for negligent misrepresentation. As to direct and in-
cidental damages measured as of the date of breach, compara-
tive fault would have been irrelevant. Principles of
comparative fault should have been permitted only in the con-
text of consequential damages. Comparative fault for the con-
sequential damages could have included failure to mitigate
damages or independent causation of damages. Ultimately, in
the event of liability, allocation among defendants should have
proceeded on the basis of indemnity principles grounded in
respective contractual duties.
174. The Rediske opinion was issued on September 24, 1985. The supreme court's
opinion in Zontelli was filed on August 9, 1985. It is possible that the Zontelli opinion
did not come to the attention of the court in Rediske. In any event, the Rediske opinion
cannot be reconciled either with the holding of the court of appeals in Zontelli or with
the holding of the supreme court in Zontelli.
The supreme court accepted review of Rediske "for the limited purpose of con-
sidering the propriety of the remand to the trial court for a determination of compar-
ative fault on issues of both fraud and negligence and the question of whether it was
error to submit to the jury [plaintiff's] claim of negligence against defendants." 377
N.W.2d at 459. This case would have presented a perfect opportunity for the
supreme court to shed additional light in this area. Unfortunately, the case was set-
tled by stipulation filed May 5, 1986 and the supreme court will not issue an opinion
in this case.
175. 374 N.W.2d at 749.
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Other panels of the court of appeals have issued opinions
which address the availability of the negligence theory in the
context of professional services. Three cases advance the view
that negligence actions are available for the recovery of eco-
nomic losses resulting from the negligent performance of
services.
The first of these is Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay Bros.
Co. 176 In that case, the court provided rather lengthy dicta in
support of the view that those who provide professional serv-
ices may be liable in tort for negligence, as opposed to con-
tract. Waldor Pump & Equipment Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron &
Associates, Inc. 177 expressly issued a holding to the same effect.
McCarthy Well Company, Inc. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc. 178 broad-
ened the holding to apply to all services, not merely profes-
sional services. Arguably, the discussions of all three opinions
erred regarding negligence as the theory applicable to claims
involving services.' 
79
Even though the Valley Farmers opinion presented dicta, 180 it
176. 380 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
177. 386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
178. 389 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
179. The supreme court granted review of Valley Farmers on April 11, 1986. Oral
argument was scheduled for September 17, 1986. No petition for review was filed in
Waldor Pump. A petition for review is pending in McCarthy Well.
180. In Valley Farmers, the court held that the transaction in question was governed
by the UCC, notwithstanding that the seller provided services along with the sale of
goods. 380 N.W.2d at 879.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has been inclined to apply the UCC to suppliers
of material for construction projects. In Kopet v. Klein, 275 Minn. 525, 532-33, 148
N.W.2d 385, 390-91 (1967), the court applied the Uniform Sales Act to the sale of a
water softener where the purchase included the cost of installation. In O'Laughlin v.
Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Minn. 1977), the court applied
the UCC to a contract for the installation of a furnace where the contractor also
selected the furnace and purchased it. The O'Laughlin case was cited with approval
but without much discussion in Alden Well Veterinarian Clinics v. Wood, 324
N.W.2d 181, 184 (Minn. 1982). See also Tri-State Ins. Co. of Luverne v. Lindsay Bros.
Co., 364 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd mem., 381 N.W.2d 446 (1986).
Cases from other jurisdictions generally rely upon the question of whether the
goods or services aspect of a contract predominates to determine whether the UCC
applies. See, e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 823
(8th Cir. 1983); LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342, 346-47 n.6
(8th Cir. 1981); Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 957-60 (8th Cir. 1974). Cf. Fenton
Area Pub. Schools v. Sorenson-Gross Constr. Co., 335 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Mich. App.
1983).
The arguments presented by the parties in their briefs to the supreme court for
Valley Farmers address primarily the question whether the court of appeals properly
determined that the transaction was governed by the UCC. The appellant argued
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presented the rationale for the rule adopted in the two suc-
ceeding cases. Valley Farmers observed:
Minnesota has long allowed negligence actions for the re-
covery of economic losses resulting from the negligent per-
formance of professional services. See City of Eveleth v. Ruble,
302 Minn. 249, 225 N.W.2d 521 (1974); Northern Petrochemi-
cal Co. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 297 Minn. 118, 211
N.W.2d 159 (1973).181
It is revealing to note that the authorities cited did not include
Lesmiester or Zontelli. The failure to refer to the cases in which
the Minnesota Supreme Court has expressly disclaimed any in-
tention to allow negligence actions for the recovery of eco-
nomic losses revealed the faulty foundations of the two more
recent holdings of the court of appeals.' 82
Valley Farmers went on to distinguish the line of cases follow-
that Lindsay Brothers could be sued in negligence, as opposed to contract, because it
provided professional services in connection with the transaction. Lindsay Brothers
seemed to concede that negligence would be the proper theory for claims against
professional designers, but contended that the facts do not permit an inference that it
provided design services.
Both Lindsay Brothers and Martin Steele defended the holding of the court of
appeals that the transaction was governed exclusively by the UCC. Accordingly, the
respondents argued that the claim in negligence was not available and that summary
judgment was appropriate because the statute of limitations barred the warranty
claim.
Based upon this author's review of the court of appeals' opinion and the briefs of
the parties before the supreme court, it appears that the court of appeals ruled prop-
erly that the UCC governed the transaction and that the claims of the plaintiff were,
therefore, barred. The dicta of the court of appeals concerning the liability of design
professionals was, evidently, issued without the benefit of any extensive briefing on
that subject, and the briefs before the supreme court also do not directly address the
principal questions of this article.
181. 380 N.W.2d at 877.
182. In a decision which preceded Buetow and the succeeding opinions of the Min-
nesota Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit relied upon a negligence theory in a con-
struction claim. In Continental Grain Co. v. Fegles Constr. Co., Inc., 480 F.2d 793,
795 (8th Cir. 1973), the claim involved alleged negligence in the design and con-
struction of a grain dryer. Some eight years after construction was completed, the
grain dryer collasped. Id. Investigation showed that the collapse was due to the set-
tling of the foundation slab. Id. The court held that a provision in the construction
contract in which the defendant guaranteed that it would replace any defective mater-
ials or worksmanship that might develop within two years following the acceptance of
the work did not limit the defendant's liablity for negligence. Id. at 797 (AIA General
Conditions now expressly explain that the guarantee period is not intended as a limi-
tation on other remedies). Because the plaintiff succeeded in proving the negligence
of the contractor, the plaintiff recovered damages for the collapsed grain dryer. It is
doubtful that Continental Grain Company could be relied upon as good authority today,
in view of the numerous subsequent Minnesota Supreme Court cases which have
addressed the general theories of recovery.
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ing Superwood on the premise that those cases involved the sale
of goods. The opinion quoted extensively from the S.J. Groves
& Sons opinion which contrasts tort law and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. 183 The implied reasons for this were to suggest
that UCC cases are more validly distinguished from negligence
theory than are other contract cases. This point does not sur-
vive analysis.
The UCC is a codification of certain principles of contract
law. Within the parameters set out in the UCC, parties are free
to negotiate for such warranties, remedies, and limitations as
they choose. In a case governed by the UCC, the question
whether a plaintiff has a remedy available depends upon the
prior negotiations of the parties and upon an assessment of the
contract terms in light of the principles codified in the UCC.
Similarly, the participants in a construction project are inva-
riably in a position to negotiate rights and obligations.
Although the legislature has not deemed it necessary to codify
general principles of contract law for commercial cases primar-
ily involving services, the contracts in such cases are neither
less valid nor less important than contracts which exist in sales
of goods cases. The only reason that parties to a construction
process come together is because of contractual undertakings.
The roles and duties of the participants are defined by
contract.
Valley Farmers offers another argument derived from an Illi-
nois appellate decision which holds that professionals can be
liable in negligence for economic loss:
In allowing the action for economic loss, the Rosos Litho
court reasoned that since the UCC is inapplicable to the
provision of professional services, a plaintiff injured as a re-
sult of professional services would have no warranty remedy
for economic loss. Therefore, '[t]he UCC policy of protect-
ing consumers by means of implied warranties would not be
promoted by depriving [plaintiff] of a viable cause of action
for economic loss. 123 Ill. App. 3d at 296, 78 Ill. Dec. at
453, 462 N.E.2d at 572.184
183. 380 N.W.2d at 877.
184. Id. at 878. Valley Farmers cited an earlier Illinois appellate court decision
which upheld the dismissal of professional engineering negligence counts seeking
damages for economic losses. Palatine Nat'l Bank v. Charles W. Greenard Assocs.
Inc., 119 Ill. App. 3d 376, 456 N.E.2d 635 (1983). Valley Farmers overlooked a third,
more recent, case from Illinois which argeed with Palatine National Bank and dis-
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Valley Farmers found this point persuasive.'8 5 Two problems
with this analysis present themselves. First, to argue that de-
sign professionals should be liable on a theory of implied war-
ranties is precluded by City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi.t8 6
Second, there is no reason to suspect that proper contract
analysis in commercial cases for economic loss will unfairly de-
prive plaintiffs of a viable cause of action. As recognized by the
supreme court in Zontelli, contract principles, supplemented by
indemnity awards, will satisfactorily cover appropriate reme-
dies in most cases.
Valley Farmers assumed the the Superwood line of cases should
not apply to all commercial loss cases:
If the court had intended to abolish professional malprac-
tice actions for economic losses, we believe it would have
done so explicitly and not by mere inference.' 8 7
As this Article has discussed, this statement overlooks the
supreme court opinions in the Buetow, Lesmeister, and Zontelli
cases which indicate that the theory of professional malpractice
actions does not sound in tort. Moreover, the principles dis-
cussed in Superwood, Fine Arts, and S.J. Groves and the explicit
agreed with Rosos Litho. See Bates & Rogers Constr. Corp. v. North Shore Sanitation
Dist., 128 Il. App. 3d 962, 471 N.E.2d 915 (Ill. App. 1984) (a carefully researched,
thorough discussion; suit by contractor and subcontractor against architect/engineer
for economic loss barred where contractor and architect are not in privity of con-
tract). See also Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Engineers, Inc., 775 F.2d 781 (7th Cir.
1985) (following Illinois law) (examining the qualified privilege of an engineer to
interpret specifications in case involving claims for economic loss); Intamin, Inc. v.
Figley-Wright Contractors, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (following Illinois
law) (no right to contribution where party seeking contribution is limited to contract
remedies).
185. 380 N.W.2d at 878.
186. 263 N.W.2d 420, 423-25 (Minn. 1978).
187. 380 N.W.2d at 878. One may approach the question of professional mal-
practice actions in three ways. First, one may ask whether such actions have been
abolished, as was done in Valley Farmers. In that event, one can study the question
whether opinions of the supreme court have abolished the theory. Second, one may
study the contracts of the parties to determine whether the parties have limited their
remedies by contract. Parties may contract for an exclusive remedy which shall be
binding on them in the event of breach of contract. Independent Consol. School
Dist. No. 24, Blue Earth County v. Carlstrom, 277 Minn. 117, 120, 151 N.W.2d 784,
786 (1967). The third, and more appropriate, approach to the question of malprac-
tice actions for economic losses is to ask whether the actions are available on the
basis of the contractual or other relationships among the parties. This approach
does not assume the existence of an action in the absence of some disclaimer.
Rather, it assumes that the action is available only if the claimant can demonstrate the
origin of a duty in a contractual or similar relationship.
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language of these cases, covering all commercial cases, should
be honored.'
88
Waldor Pump 189 continued the discussion of the nature of
professional liability. A subcontractor sought to recover eco-
nomic loss from an engineer. 190 In Waldor Pump, the court of
appeals advanced the view that "the reasonable skill and judg-
ment expected of professionals must be rendered to those who
foreseeably rely upon the services."' 9' The opinion contin-
ued: "Next we must decide whether a subcontractor who sus-
tains economic loss due to negligent peformance of a
consulting engineer may foreseeably rely on the engineer's
services."' 92 The court answered this question by finding that
subcontractors who were bound to follow the specifications
prepared by the engineer could be harmed by negligence in
drafting or interpretation of the specifications. 93 On that ba-
sis alone, the court concluded that the engineer owed a duty to
the subcontractor reasonably to draft and interpret the project
specifications. 194
This approach seems to suggest that the subjective reliance
of third parties, rather than the objective terms of the engi-
neer's contract, should determine both the scope and the ben-
eficiary of an engineer's duty. 19 5 This apprach is contrary to
188. One case from another jurisdiction which accomodates both the lines of rea-
soning found in the Minnesota Supreme Court cases is R.H. Macy & Co. v. Williams
Tile & Terrazzo Co., 585 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ga. 1984). In that case, the court dis-
missed claims against an architect by a subcontractor and a supplier reasoning that
architects would be liable only in the case of property damage or personal injury or in
situations where one could define a relationship approaching that of "privity." Id.
189. 386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
190. Id. at 377.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. This approach was suggested in Donnelly Constr. Co. v.
Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Ariz. 1984). Donnelly does not offer
any discussion of the contractor's claim against the owner. There is no recognition
of the fact that the contractor's claim against the owner should provide satisfactory
accommodation for any legitimate claims of the contractor. See, e.g., Lesmeister, 330
N.W.2d at 102.
194. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377.
195. In most cases, specifications present requirements which a subcontractor is
to bid upon. While subcontrators are to consider the specifications in their bids, the
reason is to determine a price for compliance. Typical forms call upon the subcon-
tractor to identify areas of ambiguity or contradiction. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF ARCHITECTS, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION, AIA
Doc. No. 201 (Construction Management Edition 1980); AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF AR-
CHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN CONTRACTOR AND SUBCONTRAC-
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Buetow and Zontelli. Nowhere in Waldor Pump does one find ref-
erence to the contractual undertakings of the engineer to the
engineer's client or to the terms of the contracts between the
owner, the contractor, and the subcontractor. Neither does
one find any acknowledgment of the factors governing third-
party beneficiary theory. The approach adopted in Waldor
Pump seems to ignore, without justification, any assessment of
the bargained-for expectations of the several parties.
The approach followed in Zontelli is much more satisfactory.
If the subcontractor sustained loss as a result of improper
specifications, the subcontractor may have been entitled to a
change order for additional compensation or other contractual
remedy.' 96 Formally, the subcontractor's claim may have run
to the general contractor who could have, in turn, presented
the claim to the owner. The owner, in turn, might have been
entitled to look to the engineer if the engineer breached a con-
tracted-for duty in drafting or interpreting the specifications.
This line of analysis follows the contractual relationships
among the parties and is consistent with the bargained-for ex-
pectations of the various parties.
To permit parties to ignore contractual requirements upsets
the normal administration of construction projects, often
works an inequity where specific duties and liabilities have
been allocated by contract, and creates undesirable conflicts of
interest.
General conditions of construction contracts often specify
TOR, AIA Doc. No. A-401 (Construction Management Edition 1980). See generally
Bethesda Lutheran Church, 356 N.W.2d at 349. Moreover, typical forms anticipate
change orders for requirements not called out in the original design documents. In
this context, to say that subcontractors may "foreseeably rely" on the engineer's
services seems to ignore the subcontractor's own obligations. To make any determi-
nation without explicit consideration of the contract documents seems to imply that
the courts have preconceptions as to how the parties should allocate responsibility.
For construction projects, with their relatively competitive bargaining atmosphere,
this is not good policy.
196. See Zontelli, 373 N.W.2d at 753. The circumstances under which a contractor
or subcontractor may be entitled to additional compensation have been examined in
several Minnesota Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Alley Constr. Co. v. State, 300
Minn. 346, 349-50, 219 N.W.2d 922, 924-25 (1974) (contractor's reliance on owner's
plans and specifications can be inferred from facts and circumstances surrounding
the award of the contract; direct evidence of contractor's reliance unecessary); Mc-
Cree & Co. v. State, 253 Minn. 295, 315-17, 91 N.W.2d 713, 726-27 (1958) (party
furnishing plans and specifications to contractor impliedly warrants their sufficiency
for their intended purpose). These cases are cited and relied upon in Zontelli. Id. at
752-54.
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the situations in which a subcontractor may be entitled to a
change order for additional compensation. 97 Included in
these contractual terms may be requirements of timely notice
or other conditions which are ultimately intended to facilitate
successful project completion and timely resolution of dis-
putes. To permit a subcontractor to sue an engineer after a
project is completed upon a theory of negligence will en-
courage subcontractors to ignore the notice requirements
spelled out in contract conditions. This can lead to a less effi-
cient resolution of project issues and disputes, because af-
fected owners, professionals, or other contractors may not
learn of problems until it is too late to bring about economical
solutions.
To permit parties to ignore privity requirements increases
the likelihood of having the wrong party pay for loss. For ex-
ample, consider two hypothetical cases in which a contractor
can demonstrate that the failure of the designer's plans and
specifications to disclose adequately subsurface conditions en-
title the contractor to extra compensation. In the first case,
assume that the extra cost is entirely attributable to the condi-
tion of the owner's property. Even though the designer was
negligent, had the designer adequately described the property,
the bids would have been higher. Thus, the designer's error
did not cause the loss and the owner should pay the
increase. 198
In the second case, assume that the extra cost consists of
wasted effort attributable to the designer's error, and not the
condition of the property. The owner should be entitled to
look to the designer for indemnity.
If the contractor can sue the designer directly without di-
rectly pursuing its claims against the owner, then the designer
may be obliged to pay the contractor without any clear theory
of indemnity or contribution against the owner. In the first ex-
ample, this would be unfair. To require the contractor to sue
197. An example of a paragraph anticipating reimbursement for extra work
caused by subsurface conditions materially different from those shown on plans or
soil borings is provided in Zontelli. 373 N.W.2d at 751.
198. An owner should not recover from other expenditures which are required
because of the condition of the property and not occasioned by torts or breaches of
contract. See Freeport Sulphur Co. v. The S.S. Hermosa, 526 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir.
1976) (damages issues decided under federal maritime law).
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the owner does not leave the contractor without a remedy in
either case. It merely ensures that the right party pays the bill.
To generalize that engineers have a duty running to parties
with whom they have no contract provides construction partici-
pants with novel opportunities to sue those with whom they
have no mutuality of obligation. It exposes engineers and ar-
chitects to liabilities beyond those comtemplated at the com-
mencement of the project and for which there was no
bargaining. 199
To hold that designers have a duty running to subcontrac-
tors can present engineers with an irreconcilable conflict of in-
terest. Engineers, architects, and other design professionals
ordinarily have contractual obligations to the owner or devel-
oper. In many situations, the design professionals act as the
owner's agent in a capacity that is at least arm's length from
the contractors and subcontractors and, in some cases, may be
adverse to the interests of the contractors and subcontrac-
tors. 20 0 If it were to become law that design professionals owe
a duty to any party that relies upon their services, then design
professionals would be asked to serve two masters. This is
contrary to the spirit of their undertaking with their clients.
The point is that duties in a commercial construction project
should be determined by reference to the contracts negotiated
by the parties, not an after-the-fact reallocation of responsibil-
ity by the courts. The contracts of the parties, with all their
limitations and remedies as negotiated by the parties, should
be respected by the courts. For these reasons, it is submitted,
the Waldor Pump holding is not only inconsistent with supreme
court decisions, it also reflects poor policy.
199. It should be understood that some contractors and subcontractors are re-
quired by contract to elect or retain engineers or other design professionals in their
own right. In those cases, of course, the design professionals would have duties run-
ning to their clients, the contractors.
200. For an example of potential conflicts see Richard & Assocs., Inc. v. Boney,
604 F. Supp. 1214 (E.D.N.C. 1985). In that case, a subcontractor sued an architect
for advising the owner not to pay the subcontractor's balance until a dispute between
the parties was resolved. The court ultimately dismissed the subcontractor's claim
for a failure to show duty, breach, causation, and damages. Nonetheless, the claim
illustrates the architect's dilemma. If the court had concluded that the architect owed
the subcontractor a duty, then the architect would have had a duty running both to
the owner, the architect's client, and the subcontractor, the party whose work the
architect was obligated to evaluate.
19871
53
Espel: Liability and Loss Allocation for Economic Losses in Construction
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
McCarthy Well 20 1 extends the notion that economic loss may
be pursued in tort claims to all cases involving services. The
remarkable point of this opinion is that the claim arose be-
tween two parties who had been in contractual privity. None-
theless, the court of appeals affirmed negligence analysis
without any specific regard for the contractual terms.
McCarthy Well, like Lesmeister, was tried on the theory of negli-
gence without objection. Therefore, the law of that case
should not be taken as precedent for other cases. It is notable
that the opinion makes no reference to the apparently equal
bargaining power of the parties. It relies entirely on Waldor
Pump and Valley Farmers. For the same reasons that call those
opinions into question, McCarthy Well should not be followed.
CONCLUSION
Careful attention to contractual terms and undertakings
guarantees that the bargained-for expectations of the parties
will be honored. The duties and liabilities of design profes-
sionals in construction disputes should be defined primarily by
contractual relationships. Thatjuries are asked to test the con-
duct of design professionals in terms of professional negli-
gence should not necessarily imply that the underlying theory
of liability is found in negligence. Proper analysis will recog-
nize the importance of contract.
The issues of liability theory and loss allocation are difficult.
It is impossible to provide a road map through all of the fore-
seeable types of situations. Application of the theories and
policies relating to economic loss cases requires flexibility.
Generally, however, contract principles are fair and effective
for commercial loss cases. Courts will produce the best deci-
sion if they recognize the contractual allocation of duties
among the parties for each specific project rather than to sub-
stitute an assumed, generic world view.
This viewpoint implies that contract law is the primary the-
ory for economic loss cases. The Minnesota Supreme Court
has recognized this generally when making a choice among
competing tort and contract rules. The court has demon-
strated flexibility, however, with the most important idea being
that the law should fit the facts of the specific case.
201. 389 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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